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COMMENTS

The Conservationists and the Public Lands:
Administrative and Judicial Remedies Relating
to the Use and Disposition of the Public
Lands Administered by the Department
of the Interior
Most of the land area of the United States has at some time been
in the public domain and thus under the control of the federal government.1 As territories were acquired by the nation, title to the
"vacant" lands passed to the federal government2 to be managed for
future needs or to be disposed of in the course of westward expansion.3 Today, nearly one third of those lands remain in federal
hands. 4 In addition, the federal government has acquired certain
lands for specific purposes, such as for national parks and defense
installations; and title to some lands previously disposed of by the
Government has become "revested.'' 5 These public lands are concentrated in the western states and in Alaska, and many are extremely valuable for minerals, timber, grazing and recreation.
With the exception of the national forests, which are administered
by the Department of Agriculture, most of the lands in the public
domain fall under the control of the Department of the Interior,
whose Bureau of Land Management (BLM) is responsible for administering nearly sixty per cent of the entire public domain. 6 With
that responsibility comes power to affect the utilization of the nation's natural resources and the power over the people whose
businesses and manner of living depend upon how the federal government, primarily through the Department of the Interior, exercises its proprietorship. For example, the granting of a mineral lease
may provide economic success to the lessee, while the withholding
of a grazing permit may cause ruin for a rancher who is dependent
upon federal forage lands. The purchase of land for game-management purposes, while pleasing to hunters, may burden a local govI. MAN • • • AN ENDANGERED SPECIES? 34 (U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Conservation
Yearbook No. 4, 1967).
2. A significant exception to this process was Texas, which, because it was a sovereign state prior to entering the federal union, retained control of its public lands.
3. Article IV of the United States Constitution empowers Congress to "dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Prop·
erty belonging to the United States."
4. MAN ••• AN ENDANGERED SPECIES?, supra note I, at 34.
5. Examples of "revested" lands are the Oregon and California railroad grant
lands, and the Coos Bay Wagon Road grant lands. See Act of June 9, 1916, ch. 137,
39 Stat. 218; Act of Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 47, 40 Stat. 1179. See also 43 U.S.C. §§ 118l(a)•G)
(1964).
6. MAN ••• AN ENDANGERED SPECIES?, supra note 1, at 34.
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ernment by removing property from its tax rolls; 7 and the release
of federal land to a state may, as in Alaska, mean a revenue windfall
in mineral leases. 8 The granting of national park concessions and
recreation permits on public lands can provide an economic boost
to a local economy, or-like many other actions of the Department
of the Interior, primarily those relating to mining rights or watershed utilization-it may enrage conservation groups who fear despoilment of the wilderness.
Because of the far-ranging responsibilities and powers of the
Department of the Interior, the manner in which the Department
makes its decisions and the procedures by which interested parties
may be heard are extremely important. The purposes of this Comment, then, are to examine the general structure and function of
the Department of the Interior with respect to the use and disposition of the public lands and to analyze the manner in which
persons may attain administrative and judicial review of the agency's
actions.
The scope of the Department's functions is vast, and the statutory
and regulatory materials dealing with those functions are overwhelming in their complexity and breadth.9 For that reason, this
Comment will not seek to make an exhaustive examination of the
agency's functions and procedures; rather, it will attempt to provide
a selective illustration of the agency's procedures and functions and
to concentrate on adjudicatory and review procedures, including
judicial review. Because recent years have seen a marked increase in
attention to resources and to conservation issues by persons and
groups not otherwise directly concerned with the disposition of
public lands, particular attention will be directed toward the availability of a forum for such third parties.

I.

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR: FUNCTIONAL
ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE

A. Functional Organization

The Department is headed by the Secretary of the Interior, whose
authority is delegated through a number of units headed by assistant
.

7. The impact on local tax revenues of public land ownership is of some concern.
For a discussion of problems concerning state-owned public lands, see Note, Public
Land in Minnesota: Should It Pay Compensation in Lieu of Taxation?, 54 MINN. L.
REV. 179 (1969).
8. In September 1969, the State of Alaska received bids in excess of $900,000,000
for oil drilling rights on its "North Slope" lands. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1969, at
63, col. 1.
9. The Bureau of Land Management alone administers an estimated 5,000 publiclands laws. Wheatley, A. Study of Administrative Procedures-The Department of Interior, 43 GEO. L.J. 166, 167 (1955).
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secretaries: 10 (I) Administration, (2) Water and Power Development,11
(3) Mineral Resources, 12 (4) Fish and Wildlife, Parks, and Marine
Resources,13 (5) Public Land Management including the Bureau of
Land Management, 14 and, (6) Water Quality and Research.15 Within
these functional divisions, there is frequently a substantial degree of
geographical decentralization. For example, the BLM-the division
having responsibility £or the management of most of the federal
public lands-maintains headquarters offices in eleven states; 18 and
each of these offices, termed "state" or "land" offices, supervises
numerous district offices.17
In addition to the foregoing administrative separation, there is
a further degree of separation of functions within those areas themselves, aimed in part at separating decisions of discretion and
policy from those involving administrative adjudication of legal and
factual issues. Within the BLM, £or instance, there is an Office of
Appeals and Hearings, which, in theory at least,18 remains insulated
from administrative adjudication in any given case until that case
reaches that office on appeal to the Director of the Bureau.
The Office of the Solicitor is the general legal advisor £or the
Department of the Interior and is responsible in land matters for
the handling of administrative appeals to the Secretary. That office
is functionally organized to correspond with the administrative divisions of the Department. The Office of the Deputy Solicitor
handles all appeals to the Secretary in land matters, including those
relating to mineral leases and to homestead and grazing permits.
Within that office is a Branch of Land Appeals in which are decided
10. See McCarty, A View of the Decision-Making Process Within the Department
of the Interior, 19 ABA AD. L. REv. 147, 152 (1966); U.S. Govr. ORGANIZATION MANUAL
220-21 (1969-1970).
11. The Water and Power Development division includes the Bureau of Reclamation, and the Bonneville, Southeastern, and Southwestern Power Administrations.
12. The Mineral Resources division includes the Bureau of Mines and the Geo•
logical Survey.
13. The Fish and Wildlife, Parks, and Marine Resources divisions include the
Office of the Commissioner of the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Bureau of Commercial
Fisheries, the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, the National Park Service, and
the Office of Marine Resources.
14. The Public Land Management division also includes the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, and the Office of Territories.
15. The Water Quality and Research division includes the Federal Water Quality
Administration, the Office of Saline Water, and the Office of Water Resources Research.
16. U.S. Govr. ORGANIZATION MANUAL 217-47 (1969-1970).
17. Id.
18. That separation of functions is not perfect, and some dissatisfaction with a
lack of apparent objectivity is reported. In part, that lack of assurance of objectivity
in the resolution of legal issues stems from the discretionary powers of the Secretary,
the Solicitor, and the Director of the BLM to enter and decide cases at almost any
stage of the decisional process. See McCarty, supra note 10, at 172-74.
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appeals from the Bureau of Land Management. 19 Like other administrative divisions of the Department, the office of the Solicitor is
rather decentralized geographically; there are seven regional offices,
each headed by a regional solicitor.20

B. Procedures
I. Adjudication
General guidelines applicable to administrative adjudications in
many, if not most, federal agencies are set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 21 With regard to the Department of the
Interior, however, the APA procedures dealing with hearing requirements are required in only a very limited number of cases.22
Due in part perhaps to the multiplicity of functions of the Department of the Interior, no over-all pattern of adjudication is present
within the Department; and each division seems largely to follow
its own specialized procedures, particularly with respect to appeals
from administrative determinations. Most divisions of the Department appear not to have established any uniform procedures for
appeal from the local decision; at least, few such procedures appear
in the published regulations. 23 The BLM, however, within whose
jurisdiction most of the Department's adjudications occur, has developed a detailed set of regulations.24 For the most part, the
Bureau's adjudications concern applications for grazing permits or
recreational-use permits, and for mineral leases and timber sales.
a. Initial determinations. Applications for dispositions of lands
and minerals are generally initiated in the appropriate land office of
the BLM,211 except that those relating to grazing26 or to some smaller
19. See McCarty, supra note 10, at 152.
20. U.S. GOVT. ORGANIZATION MANUAL 222 (1969-1970).
21. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
22. Those procedures are set forth generally in 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-57 (Supp. IV, 19651968), but are applicable only when a "hearing" is required by the statute covering
the particular administrative function. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
See generally McCarty, supra note IO, at 158, 178-80.
23. See generally C. McFARLAND, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES AND THE PUBLIC LANDS
154-82 (1969) [hereinafter McFARLAND]; McCarty, supra note 10, at 154. An extreme
example is the National Park Service, whose published regulations provide no guidelines at all for appellate action by an aggrieved applicant. Although the Park Service
has developed extensive regulations for processing claims, those regulations are published as a manual rather than as regulations. See McFARLAND 118-21. For a discussion
of the tendency for procedural regulations to be circulated only within a department,
hence causing difficulty for persons who seek to learn what procedures to follow, see
McFARLAND 263-71. For a discussion of the problems which that tendency may cause
with regard to exhaustion of administrative remedies for judicial review, see text
accompanying notes 264-73 infra.
24. 43 C.F.R. §§ 1700-6232 (1969).
25. See, e.g., 43 C.F.R. § 1821.2-1 (1969). See generally McFARLAND 165.
26. For a discussion of special procedures relating to grazing, see McFARLAND 101-03.
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timber sales and certain special permits are handled by the district
office or other delegated officials.27 The factual inquiry upon which
the initial determination must be based need not, in most cases,
be a formal hearing. 28 Formal hearings are mandatory in only a
small number of situations such as grazing cases29 and "contests."30
In general, there are three methods by which the BLM makes adjudications: mandatory hearings, discretionary hearings, and ex
parte determinations. Mandatory hearings are subject to the APA
hearing provisions31 and are held before a trial examiner who
meets the requirements of that Act,32 although in the case of grazing
applications, there is a preliminary determination by the district
manager, and the actual hearing is held only on "appeal" to the
examiner.33 In nearly all other cases, the initial determination is
made by the land office which has jurisdiction for the area.34 There
is provision in the regulations for a discretionary hearing, which may
be granted by the Director of the BLM either upon request of an
applicant appealing from an initial decision or upon request of an
"adverse party."35 If the request for such a hearing is granted, the
case will be heard by an examiner, who, in discretionary hearings,
is termed a "field commissioner."
There are significant differences in procedure between the required hearings and the discretionary hearings. In the required
hearings, governed by the APA, the hearing examiner has full authority to control the issues for which evidence is to be received.
But in the case of a discretionary hearing, the field commissioner
lacks that authority; instead, the Director, in ordering the hear27. McFARLAND 165 n.103.
28. McFARLAND 165 n.107, citing generally Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967); and Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941
(1966).
29. 43 C.F.R. §§ 1853.1-.6 (1969).
30. 43 C.F.R. § 1852.1 (1969). Hearings may also be required in cases involving certain mineral claims [30 U.S.C. §§ 613, 621 (1964)], and in some cases involving statutory
preferences for certain "possessory claims" such as the claims of Alaskan natives to
nonmineral lands which are under control and actual occupation. 43 C.F.R. § 1855
(1969).
31. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-56 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
32. The APA requirements relating to hearing examiners are now found in 5 U.S.C.
§§ 1305, 3105, 3344, ~362, 7521 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
33. The procedures for the preliminary determination are set forth in 43 C.F.R.
§§ 4115.2-l(a)-(c) (1969); provisions governing appeal to the examiner and hearings are
found in 43 C.F.R. §§ 1853.1-.6 (1969).
34. See McCarty, supra note 10, at 157-58.
35. 43 C.F.R. § 1843.5 (1969). ''Adverse party" is not defined in this regulation; and
it is not clear what is meant by the term, for if the party is sufficiently adverse so as
to be involved in a contest with the applicant, there is a right to a hearing. 43 C.F.R.
§ 1852.l-7(b) (1969).
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ing, designates the issues upon which evidence is to be received.36
In a required hearing, the parties submit to the examiner briefs and
proposed findings of fact and law, from which he ordinarily issues
an initial decision ruling on those issues.37 In a discretionary hearing, however, the commissioner does not make the initial decision,
but is limited to making proposed findings to be used by the Director.
Moreover, in the discretionary hearing, there is no provision for
submission of briefs to the commissioners and no opportunity for a
party to see the proposed findings before they are sent to the
Director.38
Whatever shortcomings there may be in the procedures governing discretionary hearings, they are of little note, for the discretionary hearing is seldom used.39 Due in part, perhaps, to its heavy
caseload, the Department has been reluctant to grant a hearing
unless it is required to do so.40 Hence, the determination of applications in the great majority of cases is made ex parte-that is,
factual issues are decided under circumstances in which the applicant
does not have a right to meet all the evidence adverse to his position.41 In fact, in most cases, once the applicant has complied with
the application details-for which there are generally abundant
instructions42-and has submitted his application, he has little way
36. 43 C.F.R. § 1843.5 (1969).
37. The governing provisions are found in 43 C.F.R. §§ 1852.3-8(b), 1853.5(c),
1853.6(a) (1969). However, in "designated cases"-the meaning of which is unclearthe Director may require that, even in a mandatory hearing, the examiner make only
a recommended decision, to be submitted to the Director for further consideration,
in the course of which he may make additional findings and conclusions. 43 C.F .R.
§ 1852.3-8(c) (1969). Such additional findings are apparently limited to issues and
evidence brought forth in the hearing-that is, unlike the situation in ex parte determinations (see text following note 40 infra), the Director cannot go outside the record
for his supporting material.
38. In sending the record to the Director, the parties are permitted to include
whatever briefs or statements they wish; but because of the unavailability of the proposed findings, such briefs may have either little relevance or inadequate responsiveness to the issues considered most important by the Commissioner in his proposed
findings. See generally McCarty, supra note 10, at 177-80. The public-information
provisions of the APA do not apply to such material. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. IV,
1965-1968).
39. See McFARLAND 168.
40. See McCarty, supra note 10, at 155-57.
41. The term "ex parte" is used here in a broader sense than it is with reference
to judicial proceedings. The description is from McCarty, supra note 10, at 175.
42. The specificity and number of instructions relating to applications for patents,
leases, permits, or contracts are in marked contrast to the sparsity of published regulations relating to other departmental procedures. There is some exception, however,
with respect to BLM appeals procedures; see note 46 infra and accompanying text.
See generally McFARLAND 263-74, for a discussion of problems of public information
about the departmental procedures. For an example of the specificity required in applications for even relatively minor dispositions, see instructions for applications under
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of knowing what is happening to his application, and no way of
finding out, unless he knows people in the administrative structure
and is persistent in approaching field officials.43 There may be informal conferences and questions in the course of evaluating the
application, but there is no established procedure whereby an applicant can know with certainty what is happening to his application
or what steps should be taken to remedy its defects. 44 In most instances, the application simply disappears into the administrative
machinery; and the applicant does not know what goes into his file,
who sees it, or upon what data the decision is made. 45 Because of
these apparent shortcomings in the initial determination process,
administrative appeal in this area is particularly important for the
applicant. But for the same reason, such appeal is difficult for him
to pursue effectively.
b. Administrative appeals. The BLM, in contrast to most other
agencies within the Department of the Interior, has highly developed
appeals procedures.46 Any party to the case who is adversely affected
by the initial determination, whether by hearing or ex parte decision, can appeal to the Director simply by filing, within sixty days
of the decision, a notice of appeal in the office within which the
initial decision was made. 47 Receipt of a statement of reasons for
the appeal is a prerequisite to consideration by the office of the
Director.48 That statement may either be contained in the notice
of appeal49 or sent directly to the Director within thirty days after
filing notice of appeal. 5° Concurrent with the appeal, the appellant
may request a hearing on factual issues; 51 but, as has been indicated,
the Director is reluctant to grant such hearings. 52 Following an adRecreation and Public Purposes Act, 43 U.S.C. § 869 (1964), in U.S. DEPI'. OF
INTERIOR, COMMUNITY RECREATION AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 26-38 (1963).

THE

43. See McFARLAND 166.
44. There may be procedures established within the Department, but knowledge
of them is seldom available to the applicant. Even if there has been "publication" by
the Department, it may have been lost in obscurity in the Federal Register or published in the form of a news release, departmental pamphlet, or other limited publication, in which case effective notice to the applicant or to his lawyer is problematical
at best. See generally McFARLAND 265-74.
45. McFARLAND 265-74; McCarty, supra note IO, at 177.
46. The general appeal provisions of the Bureau of Land Management are contained in 43 C.F.R. §§ 1842-44 (1969). For a discussion of the absence of similar procedures in other agencies, see McFARLAND 172.
47. 43 C.F.R. § 1842.4 (1969) (general procedure); 43 C.F.R. § 1853.7 (1969) (grazing); 43 C.F.R. § 1852.3-9 (1969) (contests).
48. 43 C.F.R. § 1842.5-1 (1969).
49. 43 C.F.R. § 1842.4(a) (1969).
50. 43 C.F.R. § 1842.5-1 (1969).
51. 43 C.F.R. § 1843.5 (1969).
52. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
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verse decision by the Director, there is usually a right to pursue the
appeal to the Secretary.153 That right may be exercised by filing with
the Director notice of appeal to the Secretary; 54 provisions relating
to a statement of reasons for appeal are the same as in the case of
an appeal to the Director.155 There is no further administrative appeal after a decision has been rendered by the Secretary, 56 although
there may be an opportunity to petition the Secretary for reconsideration.157
Although the appeals procedures outlined in the departmental
regulations with respect to appeals from BLM determinations are
essentially the same for determinations made at hearings and for
those made ex parte, the origin of the appeal may, in practice, make
a substantial difference in the handling of the case. The crucial
difference is that in the case of appeals arising from hearings,
whether required or discretionary, appellate consideration is limited
to facts and issues contained in the record, 58 whereas in the case of
appeals from ex parte determinations no comparable record is available. In the latter, moreover, the actual basis of decision-on appeal,
as well as in the initial determination-may depend on factors and
data of which the applicant has had no notice or knowledge. 59 Indeed, in some instances, during appeal from ex parte determinations
the Bureau may make an additional ex parte investigation, of which
the appellant may have no knowledge; and even if he does know
of the investigation, he is not able, as a practical matter, even to see
the report prior to decision, much less to inquire into the reliability
or accuracy of the investigation. 60
The picture of the Department's application and appeal practices, then, is one of rather loose procedural requirements governing
agency action. The Department enjoys a great deal of administrative
discretion with respect to its proprietorship over the public lands,
and that discretion apparently is thought to carry over to the procedural restrictions which it applies to itself. 61 In contrast, the De53. 43 C.F.R. § 1844.1 (1969).
54. 43 C.F.R. § 1844.2 (1969).
55. 43 C.F.R. § 1844.3 (1969).
56. 43 C.F.R. § 1844.9 (1969).
57. See, e.g., B.E. Burnaugh, 67 Interior Dec. 366 (1960); McCarty, supra note 10, at
159.
58. See, e.g., 43 C.F.R. §§ 1840.0·8, 1853.9 (1969).
59. See generally McFARLAND 171-73; McCarty, supra note 10, at 177-80.
60. See McFarland 172; McCarty, supra note 10, at 177-78. See also Robertson v.
Udall, 349 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir. 1965) and Verna I. Clancy, Sacramento No. 072,582
(April 13, 1965) (Interior Dec.). But cf. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), discussed in note 295 infra.
61. McFARLAND 158. See also, with respect to Departmental discretion, the discussions on classifications, in the text accompanying note 66 infra and on judicial review
in the text accompanying notes 277-310 infra.
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partment expects persons dealing with the agency to adhere strictly
to procedure. True, the procedures for appeal are not particularly
complex; and the requirements for filing are made clear in the
departmental regulations. 62 But those rules are very strictly construed, and failure to conform with rules concerning the content of
an appeal or with filing deadlines, for example, results in summary
dismissal. 63 Even when summary dismissal under the regulations is
discretionary, 64 the apparent practice of the Department is to dismiss
in all cases, presumably in order to minimize its case load.65
2. Classification
a. Nature and purpose. The basic policy question of the general use to which public lands should be put is seldom in issue in
adjudications and appeals of the sort outlined above. Instead, such
broader issues are disposed of in advance of any adjudication involving a particular claimant; and the process by which such prior
determination is made is known generally as "classification." 00
Classification is somewhat analogous to zoning, in that it limits the
range of uses to which the public lands may be subject. 07 The
Secretary of the Interior has long held discretionary authority under
the Taylor Grazing Act68 to classify lands which fall within the scope
of that Act.<m Today, under the Classification and Multiple Use Act
of 1964,70 the Secretary has an affirmative duty to classify all public
lands administered exclusively by him through the BLM. Classification under the latter statute is for the purpose of determining first,
which lands should be disposed of by the federal government and
which should be retained and managed, and second, with respect
to those lands'which are to be retained, to what use they should be
put.
In view of the strong public interest in the manner in which
public lands are used generally, and the strong private interest which
62. 43 C.F.R. §§ 1850-53 (1969).
63. See McCarty, supra note 10, at 164-68.
64. 43 C.F.R. § 1840.0-7 (1969).
65, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT MANUAL§ 1843.2; McCarty, supra note 10, at 167.
66. See generally McFARLAND 10-18.
67. Classification seems to be more concerned with general land-use planning than
with the spot disposition of a particular piece of land. Indeed, through disposal of
land to localities, the Department of the Interior appears to be able to exert con•
siderable influence on the manner in which a local government chooses to plan its
land use. 43 U.S.C. § 1422 (1964) prohibits the disposition of public lands under 43
U.S.C. § 1411 (1964) unless the local government has first enacted zoning regulations,
and the regulations of the Department require that such zoning be "adequate." 43
C.F.R. § 2410.l-3(b), (c) (1969). See generally McFARLAND 13-14.
68. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-15(g), 315(h)-15(m), 315(n), 315(0)-l (1964).
69. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 315, 315(£) (1964).
70. 43 u.s.c. §§ 1411-18 (1964).
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often exists in the use of particular public lands, the classification
decision assumes substantial importance. To the extent that the
Secretary is bound by his promulgated regulations and classifications,
a classification may significantly narrow the range of choice on subsequent applications. Thus, for example, if an area of land has been
classified for wilderness preservation, an applicant seeking to use the
land for mineral production or industrial development may find
that his claim had been effectively disposed of well in advance of his
application. From another perspective, if a conservation group or
local citizen wants to object to an application for timber or mineral
rights to land, and if that land has been classified for such development, the objector has little basis upon which to object either in
the administrative process or, as will be seen, in the courts.71
Skeletal criteria to guide classification are included in the 1964
statute, but the guideposts seem spaced widely enough to leave considerable room for the exercise of discretion in the promulgation
and subsequent application of regulations under the statute.72 The
statute requires that all classifications be made in accordance with
statute or regulation, 73 and the regulations issued under this statute
are themselves sufficiently broad that they do not confine the broad
administrative discretion conferred by the statute.74
In addition to the 1964 Act which establishes this general
classification process, numerous other statutory provisions make
classification a prerequisite to the disposal of certain lands.75 In such
71. See text accompanying notes 328-47 infra.
72. The Secretary is to develop and promulgate regulations for the disposal of
lands that are either required for the orderly growth and development of a community or chiefly valuable for residential, commercial, agricultural (exclusive of lands
chiefly valuable for grazing and raising forage crops), industrial, or public uses or
development. Similarly the Secretary is to issue regulations for the retention and
federal management of lands for (1) domestic livestock grazing, (2) fish and wildlife
development and utilization, (3) industrial development, (4) mineral production, (5)
occupancy, (6) outdoor recreation, (J) timber production, (8) watershed protection,
(9) wilderness preservation, or (10) preservation of public values that would be lost if
the land passed from federal ownership. 43 U.S.C. § 1411(a) (1964). The statute also
provides that, in making his determination, the Secretary shall "give due consideration to all pertinent factors, including, but not limited to, ecology, priorities of use,
and the relative values of the various resources in particular areas." 43 U.S.C. § 1411(b)
(1964).
73. 43 U.S.C. § 1411(b)(I) (1964).
74. The regulations promulgated by the Secretary under the statute are similarly
broad, consisting largely of a verbose repetition of the content of the statute. See 43
C.F.R. §§ 2410.1-1 to -.1-3 (1969). See also text accompanying notes 138-40, 333-36
infra.
75. The statutes are enumerated in 43 C.F.R. § 2410.0-3 (1969) and include, in part,
provisions of the Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315(f)-(g) (1964); Isolated Tracts
Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1171 (1964); Small Tracts Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 682(a)-(e) (1964); Recreation
and Public Purposes Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 869(1)-(4) (1964); Public Land Sale Act, 43
U.S.C. §§ 1421-27 (1964); and the Classification and Multiple Use Act of 1964, 43
u.s.c. §§ 1411-18 (1964).
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situations, applications for land often involve a two-step process,
in which the applicant must first seek an appropriate classification
for the particular tract of land and thereafter pursue his application
in the usual manner. 76 Such classifications by petition differ from
the more general classification required by the 1964 Act in that they
usually apply only to a small tract, whereas general classifications
may apply to a large area. Even though classifications by petition
are limited to small tracts, however, their impact may go beyond the
immediate parties and lands. Subsequent general classifications and
policies will have to take into consideration existing uses-and hence
the previous limited classifications.77 Moreover, the decision-making
process in a classification by petition may include the announcement
of policies of more general application. 78 Thus, the manner by which
even small individual classifications are made may be of more general
concern, for "[n]ot infrequently, as one strand in this gigantic web
is moved, another starts to vibrate." 79
b. Procedures for classification. Classification procedures and
criteria are set out in broad terms in the 1964 statute80 and in somewhat more specific terms in the regulations. 81 Classification may be
triggered by an applicant in a petition-application or, for large-tract
classifications, may be initiated by an "authorized officer." 82 The
same basic classification procedures are followed regardless of how
the classification was initiated. In the case of classifications for disposal of land, 83 the state director of the BLM is to serve notice of a
76. McFARLAND 16-17. In many instances, there is a combined procedure, whereby
an applicant includes with his application a "petition for classification." See 43 C.F.R.
§ 2411.1-1 (1969).
77. The 1964 legislation requires the Secretary to considei: "aU pertinent factors"
in determining a classification. 43 U.S.C. § 14ll(b) (1964). The regulations include as
pertinent factors present and potential uses and minimum disturbance of existing
users. 43 C.F.R. § 2410.1-1 (1969).
78. See, e.g., Hugh S. Ritter, 72 Interior Dec. Ill (1965), a case which involved
only forty acres of land and two applicants, but in which the Secretary announced a
policy that no California lands irrigable by the Colorado River would be classified
for public entry until the water shortage was cured. The decision was of interest to
persons in a large area, but was reached in a relatively minor case of which the public
affected by the decision had no effective notice.
79. McCarty, supra note 10, at 147.
80. 43 u.s.c. §§ 1412, 1414 (1964).
81. 43 C.F.R. § 2411 (1969).
82. Who is an "authorized officer" for purposes of initiating a classification is not
entirely clear from the regulations. In the case of classifications by petition, the authorized officer is whoever makes the preliminary determination and forwards the
proposed classification to the state director. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-l(b) (1969). But in the
case of a Department-initiated classification, whether for disposal [43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-2
(1969)] or retention [43 C.F.R. § 2411.2 (1969)], the reference is merely to an "authorized officer."
83. The regulations distinguish between a classification for the disposal of land
and a classification for the retention of land for federal management under the
Sustained Use and Multiple Yield Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1413, 1415 (1964).
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proposed classification decision, with supporting reasons, on any
petitioner-applicants, 84 on any grazing permittee or lessee on the
land,85 on the District Advisory Board, 86 on any local governing
body having zoning jurisdiction over the area,87 and on "any governmental official ... from whom the record discloses comments on
the classification have been received." 88 For a period of thirty days
following service of a proposed disposal classification, any interested
party may file a protest with the state director, 89 who then "may"
require such statements and testimony, or conduct such further field
investigations, as he deems necessary. 90 After having reviewed any
protests, the state director issues the initial classification decision, 91
which is then subject to the general supervisory authority of the
Secretary for an additional thirty days, during which period the
Secretary may alter the classification on motion of a petitionerapplicant, or motion of any protestant, or on his own motion. 92
Upon expiration of that period, the initial classification decision
becomes the final order of the Secretary,93 subject only to his continuing power to vacate or modify it "personally and not through a
delegate." 94
If the disposal classification is to apply to a large tract of land,
there must be compliance with certain additional notice and hearing requirements. In such cases, publication of the proposed classification must be made both in the Federal Register and in a newspaper having general circulation in the vicinity of the affected
land.95 Moreover, notice must be sent directly not only to those who
must be notified of any small-tract classification decision, 96 but also
to certain other governmental officials97 and to "any other party the
authorized officer determines to have an interest in the proper use
of the lands." 98 The foregoing procedure must be followed in any
84. 43 C.F.R. § 24ll.l•l(c)(l)(i) (1969).
85. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-l(c)(l)(ii) (1969).
86. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-l(c)(l)(iii) (1969).
87. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-l(c)(l)(iv) (1969).
88. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-l(c)(l)(v) (1969).
89. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-l(d)(l) (1969).
90. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.l-l(d)(3) (1969).
91. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.l-l(d)(3) (1969).
92. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-l(e) (1969).
93. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-l(e)(l) (1969).
94. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.l-1{£)(2) (1969).
95. 43 U.S.C. § 1412 (1964); 43 C.F.R. § 2411.l-2(b) (1969).
96. See text accompanying notes 84-88 supra.
97. These officials include the head of the local governing body, the state governor,
the BLM multiple-use advisory board for the state, and the county land-use planning
officer or committee. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.l-2(b) (1969).
98. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.l-2(b) {1969).
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disposition classification involving more than 2,560 acres; and if the
proposed classification affects more than 25,000 acres, the "authorized
officer" is required to hold a "public hearing" as well. 99 The regulations permit the authorized officer to hold a public hearing for
smaller dispositions if "he determines that sufficient public interest
exists to warrant the time and expense of a hearing." 100 However,
in view of the rather negative phrasing of this regulation, and in
view of the reluctance of the BLM to hold public hearings in any
rule making,101 it seems unlikely that authorized officials will avail
themselves of that authority with much frequency. Administrative
review by the Secretary of large-tract disposition classifications is
essentially the same as for small tracts, 102 except that additional
publication in the Federal Register is required. 103
When a proposed classification favors the retention of public
lands in public ownership for purposes of managing those lands for
multiple use and sustained yield, the classification procedures are
somewhat different. Rather surprisingly, they are more strict for
retention than for disposal. Proposed retention classifications must
be indicated on a map which is publicly available in the local BLM
district office.104 Publication in the Federal Register and in a local
newspaper is required for proposed retention classifications for large
tracts105 and is permitted for smaller tracts; and notice of any retention classification must be sent not only to the parties who have
a right to notice in disposition classifications,106 but also to licensees,
lessees, and permittees, and to "any other parties indicating interest
in such classifications."107 The period for receiving comments on the
proposal is, in this situation, at least sixty days,108 as opposed to only
thirty days in the case of disposal classifications. Following the expiration of that period, the proposed classification becomes the initial
classification, which is then subject to administrative review by the
Secretary, presumably on the same basis as are other classification
decisions.109
99. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.l-2(b) (1969). Such hearing is not required by the statute;
thus, this is one of the few instances in the public-lands area in which departmental
regulations narrow somewhat the discretion permitted under the statute.
100. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.l-2(b)(2) (1969).
101. The public-lands agencies are exempt from § 4 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553
(Supp. IV, 1965-1968), which requires notice and sometimes hearings in rule making;
5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). Although there is usually voluntary compliance wi:.h notice considerations, "hearings" are infrequent. See McFARLAND 245 n.110.
102. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
103. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.l-2(d) (1969).
104. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.2(a), (b) (1969).
105. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.2(a) (1969).
106. See note 97 supra.
107. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.2(a) (1969).
108. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.2(a) (1969).
109. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.2(c) (1969). Administrative review is limited under 43 C.F.R.
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3. Third-Party Interests
a. In adjudications. Because of the public importance of the
use of the public lands generally, and because that public interest
may extend even to small dispositions,11° the handling of third-party
objections to decisions affecting the public lands assumes substantial
importance. As indicated previously, it seems that the administrative
procedures-particularly the appellate procedures-relating to public-land uses and dispositions fail to provide fully adequate protection for the applicants themselves.111 That protection withers away
almost entirely when the interests of third parties are in question.
Under the AP A there is a general right for any interested person to
appear before an agency in order to make known his views "so far
as the orderly conduct of public business permits."112 But the Department of the Interior's regulations generally fail to emphasize, or
even to provide, specific procedures for such appearances.113 In
initial determinations not involving a hearing, an interested party
is accorded the status of a "protestant"114 and has the right to file a
protest with the officer who makes the initial decision. In the case
of homestead entries, in which the applicant is claiming a statutory
right or preference for which he is required to prove his eligibility,1115
a protestant, in addition to merely filing a protest, may appear as a
witness before the officer examining the claim.116 In either case, the
action to be taken on a protest appears to lie entirely within the
discretion of the officer, who is to take such action "as is deemed
appropriate in the circumstances."117 When a hearing is required,
as in cases involving grazing permits and in contested cases, third
parties may be accorded status as intervenors; but that decision too
is subject to administrative discretion.11 8
With respect to procedures for administrative appeal, the rights
of third parties are even more nebulous. It seems that generally
§ 2411.l-l(e)(2), (4) (1969) to petitioning the Secretary; no other review or appeal by
an applicant or protestant is allowed.

110. See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
111. See text accompanying notes 37-45, 58-65 supra.
112. APA § 6(b), 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
113. See McFARLAND 166 n.111.
114. See, e.g., 43 C.F.R. § 1852.1-2 (1969) (protests).
115. 43 u.s.c. § 251 (1964).
116. 43 C.F.R. § 1823.1-2 (1969). A hearing-type proceeding is involved in this
situation; but it is not the type provided for by the APA. There is no right to confront witnesses; in fact, all testimony is given in private to the examiner alone, 43
C.F.R. § 1823.2-2 (1969), with cross-examination available only to the governmental
officer. 43 C.F.R. § 1823.2-1 (1969).
117. 43 C.F.R. § 1852.1-2 (1969).
118. In grazing-permit cases, in which a hearing is required by statute, any person
who "in the opinion of the district manager may be directly affected by the decision"
may be notified and recognized as an intervenor. 43 C.F.R. § 1853.2 (1969).
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there is no right of appeal for third parties; the regulations allow
appeal to the Director only for "any party to the case who is adversely
affected." 119 For appeals to the Secretary from the Director's decision, however, the regulations are somewhat broader, omitting the
words "to the case."120 Hence, if "party" were construed broadly to
include any person, it might seem that there would be a right to
appeal to the Secretary in the unlikely event that it was not necessary
first to have pursued an appeal to the Director, for which there
would not have been standing under the regulations. Perhaps preliminary appeal to the Director would not be necessary when a
lower official's decision is deemed to be that of the Director. It seems,
however, that such vicarious approval usually occurs only after the
expiration of a period in which to pursue an appeal to the Director,
and the regulations specifically preclude appeal to the Secretary
when the party adversely affected has failed to appeal from the
initial decision.121 Hence, it appears unlikely that in the ordinary
case a third party could successfully base standing for appeal on
the omission of the words "to the case" in the regulation dealing with
appeal to the Secretary; only in the rare instance in which the Director himself had entered a case at the outset might a third-party
appeal to the Secretary be predicated on that ground.
The availability of a third-party appeal seems further limited by
the posture which the Department has indicated in its case decisions,
in which "party" appears to be construed quite strictly.122 The Department may permit some distinction, however, according to the
degree of the interest possessed by the third party; and a person who
has some personal stake in the subject matter, even though his
interest is not sufficient to make him a party to the case, has a
better chance of being considered an " 'adversely affected' party"
than does a "self-appointed guardian of the public interest." 123
Moreover, if standing to be a party has been erroneously denied by
the Director, the Secretary may permit an appeal even though the
appellant is not formally a party to the case. 124
b. In classification. Because classification decisions are potentially more far-ranging than are most individual adjudications, it
might be expected that the classification process would accord greater
recognition to third-party interests than is the case with the ad119. 43 C.F.R. § 1842.2 (1969) (emphasis added).
120. 43 C.F.R. § 1844.I (1969).
121. 43 C.F.R. § 1844.I (1969).
122. See, e.g., John J. Farrelly, 62 Interior Dec. I (1965); United States Steel Corp.,
63 Interior Dec. 318 (1956).
123. See McFARLAND 84 n.132, citing Wight v. Dubois, 21 F. 693 (C.C. Colo. 1884);
and Neilson v. Champagne Mining&: Milling Co., 119 F. 123 (8th Cir. 1902) (mining
lease cases).
124. Godfrey Nordmark, 65 Interior Dec. 299 (1958).
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judicatory process. Such greater recognition would be particularly
appropriate in light of the fact that, because classification proceedings are not adjudicatory in the sense of being adversary, all persons
interested in the classification decision are third parties. Indeed, the
recognition of third-party interests might extend even to the interests of the "self-appointed guardians of the public interest."
Under current departmental regulations, however, treatment of third
parties in the classification process is even more dependent upon
administrative discretion than it is in the adjudicatory process.
Notice of classification is given to certain specified interested
parties, 125 but only in retention classifications can those persons who
have previously indicated general interest in classifications be assured
of receiving notice of proposed classifications.126 After notice of a
proposed classification has been served on those specified persons, any
person-whether or not he is one upon whom notice is required to
be served-may file with the state Director a protest regarding that
proposed classification. Protests may be filed anytime within thirty
days in the case of small-tract disposal classifications,127 and within
sixty days in the case of retention classifications and large-tract disposal classifications.128 Moreover, for large-tract disposal and retention classifications, the authorized officer may hold a "public hearing.''129 But no specific procedures are set forth to govern such public
hearings; apparently these hearings are simply an opportunity for
the interested public to be heard, after which the authorized officer
is free to make whatever initial classification decision he wishes, so
long as he remains within the broad confines of the general classification criteria.130
The regulations are extremely vague with respect to procedures
for administrative appeal from classification decisions. The only
language directly treating appeals in this area is ambiguous as to
whether the standard appeal procedures are applicable to classification decisions. 131 If the standard appeal provisions are applicable,
125. 43 C.F.R. §§ 2411.1-l(c), .l-2(b), .2(a) (1969). See text accompanying notes 8388 supra.
126. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.2(a) (1969).
127. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-l(d) (1969).
128. 43 C.F.R. §§ 24ll.l-2(c), 24ll.2(a) (1969). The regulations do not clearly indicate with whom protests concerning large-tract dispositions or retentions should be
filed. For small-tract dispositions, the protest is filed with the state Director; but for
others, the regulations speak only of the "authorized officer."
129. 43 C.F.R. § 24ll.l-2(b), 24ll.2(a) (1969). See text accompanying notes 99-101
supra.
130. These criteria are set forth in 43 C.F.R. § 2410 (1969) (discussed in text accompanying note 81 supra), and more generally in 43 C.F.R. §§ 1725, 1727 (1969).
131. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.l(e)(4) (1969) provides:
No petitioner-applicant or protestant to a proposed classification decision of a
State Director to whom the provisions of, this section are applicable shall be
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the classification area might possibly be an instance in which an
aggrieved third party would have standing to appeal to the Secretary,
without first having met the stricter provisions concerning appeal to
the Director, since in this situation-at least with regard to smalltract disposal classifications-the initial decision is made by the
state Director.132 On the other hand, the appeal provision, strictly
construed, precludes all administrative review except that provided
in that section-namely, a right to petition the Secretary to exercise
his supervisory authority. 133 A strict reading of the provision might
also indicate, however, that the specified appeal procedure applies
only to that particular section, which relates solely to those classification decisions involving petition-applications for small-tract disposals. So read, this provision says nothing about appeals from largetract disposal classifications or from retention classifications.
The regulations which deal specifically with appeals from largetract disposal or retention classifications are even more unclear with
respect to the rights of third parties than is the foregoing provision
found in the classification-by-petition section. No specific procedures
are provided for review of large-tract disposal and retention classifications, although the large-tract disposal sections seem to anticipate
that the Secretary will exercise his supervisory authority after having
received motions from interested persons or protestants.134 In the
case of retention classifications, no reference is made to "supervisory
authority"; rather, the reference is simply to "administrative review
by the Secretary," and it is not clear how that review is to be triggered. If the review provision found in the classification-by-petition
section is read as not applying to other forms of classification, it may
be that the standard forms of review-precluded for classifications
by petition-do apply to other types of classifications.135 But even
if those standard forms of review do so apply, it is scant comfort
to the protestant, for, as has been shown, he is likely to be barred
from using the standard appeal provisions.136 At best, it seems that
the most the interested third party can expect by way of appeal from
an initial classification decision is merely to petition the Secretary
to exercise administrative review or general supervisory authority.
entitled to any administrative review other than that provided by this section
or to appeal under provisions of Parts 1840 and 1850 [the general appeal provisions] of this chapter.
132. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-l(d)(l), (3) (1969). For a discussion of the difference in
standards for appeal between appeal to the Director and appeal to the Secretary, see
text accompanying notes 119-21 supra.
133. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-l(e)(2) (1969).
134. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-2(d) (1969).
135. Those standard review procedures are found in 43 C.F.R. pts. 1840, 1850
(1969), and, because of the provision set forth in note 131 supra, are apparently inapplicable to review of petition-classification decisions.
136. See text accompanying notes 119-24 supra.
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Nevertheless, the inability of third parties to utilize standard
appeal procedures should not be accorded great importance, for
even if there were a right of appeal from a classification decision,
such appeal would probably be futile because of what can well be
described as a tremendous loophole in the area of administrative
control of the classification process. That administrative gap stems
from the provision that lands are to be segregated from conflicting
uses after a proposed classification has been announced. The purpose
of such segregation, as contemplated by the 1964 statute, is eminently
reasonable: to prevent harm to public lands during the period between proposal of a classification and its effective date. 137 Thus, after
a proposed classification is announced, the land becomes segregated
from all uses which would be inconsistent with the proposed classification;138 and, conversely, the land is open to uses which are consistent with the proposed classification. The potential hiatus in
administrative supervision occurs as follows. The segregative effect
takes place upon the authorized officer's announcement of the proposed classification; but administrative review, however achieved,
does not, and cannot, according to the regulations, take place until
the initial decision has been made and notice of it published.139
During the period between proposal of classification and announcement of an initial classification decision, there is no administrative
review under the regulations; yet the segregative effect of the proposal is operative. The duration of that period runs up to two years
and can be extended for another two years if the authorized officer
gives notice of a proposed continuance.140
Thus, insofar as can be determined from the published regulations, it seems that the administrative official who first proposes a
classification can significantly narrow the range of alternative classifications. For example, if the authorized officer proposes to classify
certain lands for mineral production or other development, the
land will remain open to those uses during the period of segregation.
By the time that the actual initial classification is made, commencing
the running of the period for appeal to the Secretary, the uses
initiated during the segregative period may have become so entrenched that even if the Secretary would have been inclined to
classify the land for a more restricted use, such as recreation or
wilderness, the land may no longer be attractive for that use. Moreover, to the extent that the Secretary is confined by his classification
criteria-which include consideration of existing uses--the range
137. 43 u.s.c. § 1414 (1964).
138. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 2411.l-2(e), 2411.2(e) (1969).
139. See 43 C.F.R. § 2411.l-2(c) (1969) (large-tract disposals); 43 C.F.R. § 2411.2(c)
(1969) (retentions).
140. 43 C.F.R. §§ 2411.l-2(e)(2)(iv), 2411.2(e)(2)(iv) (1969).
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within which he can practically exercise his supervisory authority
is narrowed further.
Conservationists might be expected to view with distaste the
potential abuses inherent in the segregation process. Their rancor
may be multiplied when they discover that there is no equivalent
discretion when the proposed classification favors a more restricted
use of the sort likely to be attractive to the conservationists. At least
in the case of large-tract disposals, notice of a proposed classification
cannot alter the availability of the lands under applicable laws for
leasing, licensing, or permitting, or for disposal of the mineral and
vegetable resources of the lands.141 Disposition under the mining
laws may be precluded by the proposal; 142 but that restriction provides little comfort to the conservationist for whom a large gravel
pit not subject to the restrictions of the mining laws may be fully as
unattractive as an iron mine, and for whom there would not be even
the redeeming consideration that nationally important mineral resources were being developed.
Although those involved in a frenetic quest for an antiestablishment cause may be inclined to view the situation as an exploitationist
conspiracy, the more reasonable explanation for the approach of the
regulations is that it is a recognition of the fact that use of the
public lands is an integral part of many local economies in western
states, and that consequently prohibition of traditional rights and
uses of the public lands merely upon the proposal of a local officer
could be severely disruptive of those economies. The situation does
not suggest a search for an enemy, but rather points out the need for
better administrative procedures to aid in ensuring that the initial
decisions of local officers are in fact subject to executive direction,
rather than the reverse, as seems presently to be the case. A further
inquiry might reasonably be made into the manner in which the
departmental rules and regulations-together with their shortcomings-are adopted. Although a detailed examination of that process
is beyond the scope of this Comment, it should be noted that there
appears to be substantial dissatisfaction with the failure of publiclands agencies to give adequate consideration to public participation
in the rule-making process.143

III.

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Because of the problems likely to be encountered by individuals
who deal with the public-lands administrators of the Department of
141. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.l-2(e)(l) (1969).
142. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.l-3(e)(l) (1969).
143. See, e.g., Carver &: Landstrom, Rule-Making as a Means of Exercising Secretarial Discretion in Public Lands Actions, 8 .ARlz. L. REv. 46 (1966); McCarty, supra
note 10, at 170-72; cf. C. REICH, BUREAUCRACY AND THE FORESTS 13 (1962). Cf. Bonfield,

Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to Public Property, Loans,
Grants, Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 540 (1970).
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the Interior, it might seem particularly appealing to resort to judicial
review of administrative decisions which are considered unsatisfactory. However, the obstacles to judicial review in this area are
manifold. An initial problem is that of standing. Since most adjudications of the Department of the Interior concern the granting
or withholding of a license, permit, or sale, there may be no individual legal right upon which to predicate a lawsuit, if what is
sought is deemed to be a "Government gratuity." 144 Further difficulties are posed by the bar of sovereign immunity and by the fact
that many determinations appealed from are likely to have been
committed to agency discretion by statute. Other problems concern
jurisdiction for review and the type of proceeding by which judicial
review should be sought. In addition, there may be problems relating to the proper parties to the case; thus in a dispute which is
essentially between private parties, if the Government must be
joined as an indispensable party, sovereign immunity or a quirk in
the venue law may vitiate the case. Another problem is how to determine whether administrative remedies have been exhausted; indeed,
in light of the frequent obscurity of departmental regulations governing administrative appeals, that determination may be exceedingly difficult. A related question is whether the issue is ripe for
review. That problem can be particularly troublesome if appeal is
sought from a classification decision, for in that case it must be
determined whether classification may be considered a final decision
by the agency and whether the injury complained of is proximate
enough to warrant judicial intervention. If the foregoing problems
do not as a general matter bar judicial review, then there arises the
question of the scope of review: may a court depend upon a factual
record developed in non-APA administrative proceedings, or must
the court hold a proceeding de novo, or is a middle approach, such
as remand, available to the court? Questions such as these confront
the person who seeks judicial review of decisions of the Department
of the Interior.
A. Types of Review
With the exception of tort claims falling under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 145 and monetary claims falling under the Tucker146 or
Court of Claims Acts,147 the judiciary has considered actions of the
Department of the Interior primarily through operation of nonstatutory review and, to a much lesser extent, by specific statutory
144. See, e.g., Hamel v. Nelson, 226 F. Supp. 96, 99 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
145. 28

u.s.c.

§§ 1346(b), 1402(b), 1504, 2110, 2401-02, 2411-12, 2671-80 (1964).

146. 24 Stat. 505 (1887), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a),(b),(d) (1964).
147. 10 Stat. 612 (1855), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964).
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authorization either for judicial review or for original court proceedings.
Original court proceedings are required for the initial determinations in certain mineral cases, including those involving conflicting claims for possession in applications for a mineral patent,148
and certain actions for cancellation of oil leases149 and of pipeline
rights of way.150 In addition, in a few instances there is direct statutory provision for judicial review of administrative determinations.151 But in all other cases, review, if any, must be nonstatutory
-that is, based either upon the general review provisions of the
APA, 152 or upon some other general federal statutory provision, such
as that governing mandamus. 153 Nearly all actions seeking review of
administrative decisions of the Department of the Interior are nonstatutory in nature; 154 accordingly, emphasis will be given here to
the procedures and problems involved in that type of review.

B. N onstatutory Review
I. Basis for Review: Standing and Legal Right
In general, a plaintiff seeking judicial review of agency action
must demonstrate that he has suffered harm from the agency's action
and that such action has violated a legally protected right. 155 Strictly
speaking, the "standing" question is concerned only with whether
the plaintiff has suffered harm sufficient to place him in an adversary
position with the defendant, 156 and the issue of whether a legally
protected right has been invaded goes to the question of reviewability rather than to that of standing.157 Frequently, however, these
148. 30 u.s.c. § 30 (1964).
149. 30 U.S.C. § 184 (1964); 43 U.S.C. § 1334 (1964); 43 C.F.R. § 3386.2 (1969) (offshore drilling).
150. 30 u.s.c. § 185 (1964).
151. See, e.g., statutory limitation on actions contesting departmental adjudications
of statutory rights respecting oil and gas leases, 30 U.S.C. § 226·2 (1964), and judicialreview provisions concerning cancellation of leases under the Outer Continental Shelf
Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1335(d) (1964); cf. the statutory-review provision under Federal Power
Commission Act, 16 U.S.C. § 825(2) (1964).
152. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
153. 28 u.s.c. § 1361 (1964).
154. See McFARLAND 184.
155. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 501 (1965) [hereinafter
JAFFE].
156. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 38
U.S.L.W. 4193, 4199 (U.S. March 3, 1970) (dissenting opinion).
157. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 38 U.S.L.W.
4193, 4199 (U.S. March 3, 1970) (dissenting opinion). The APA conditions the right to
review upon the existence of a legal wrong: "A person suffering legal wrong because
of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." APA § lO(a), 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
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two questions are joined together under the rubric of "standing."1158
Thus it has been stated that standing does not exist "unless the right
invaded is a legal right-one of property, one arising out of contract,
one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute
which confers a privilege." 1150
In the cases involving regulatory agencies whose activities may
impinge upon an individual's property rights or othe.r common-law
rights, the existence of a legal right upon which to base a suit may
be found outside any statutory grant.169 However, in the case of
decisions by the Department of the Interior concerning the public
lands, the existence of a legal right is dependent entirely upon statutory authorization, for the power of Congress over the public
domain has been described as "plenary" such that persons have
only those rights to public lands as have been granted by Congress.161
Such rights may be found, for instance, in statutes creating rights
to homestead patents162 or mining patents163 upon compliance with
specified criteria, or may he found in statutes creating preference
rights to grazing permits,164 sales,1615 or dispositions following classification.166 In addition to those legal rights granted by statute, rights
may he created by departmental regulations, an example of which
is the preference accorded the initial applicant in petition classifications.167 But it is not necessary for the existence of standing that the
right be one the interference with which is legally compensable.
For example, although the Taylor Grazing Act creates no "right,
title, interest, or estate in or to the lands," 168 and although permits
issued under that Act may be withdrawn without compensation,169
the decision to grant or withdraw must be consistent with statute
and regulation; if it is not, the aggrieved party has standing to challenge the administrative action.179
158. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 38
U.S.L.W. 4193 (U.S. March 3, 1970); Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118
(1939).
159. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137 (1939) (dictum).
160. See generally Lee v. CAB, 225 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Doehla Greeting
Cards, Inc. v. Summerfield, 116 F. Supp. 68 (D.D.C. 1953).
161. Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334 (1963); Hamel v. Nelson,
226 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
162. See generally 43 U.S.C. §§ 2, 15, 161, 164, 251-56, 271-84, 321, 329 (1964).
163. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 15 (1964); 30 U.S.C. § 29 (1964).
164. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1964) (order of preference for grazing permits).
165. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1432 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
166. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-4 (1969).
167. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-4 (1969). Concerning the binding effect of regulations generally, see Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
168. 43 u.s.c. § 315(b) (1964).
169. Acton v. United States, 401 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1968).
170. See, e.g., LaRue v. Udall, 324 F.2d 428 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
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Courts are generally quite liberal in construing statutes to find
the existence of a legal right sufficient to afford a plantiff standing
and the right to seek review. Thus it is said that there is a judicial
tendency to expand the class of aggrieved persons entitled to seek
review under the APA171 and that review will not be precluded
"unless that purpose is fairly discernible in the statutory scheme." 172
Occasionally the requisite standing and legal right may be inferred from general policy expressions of Congress. For example,
congressional statements favoring the consideration of conservation
interests in particular federal projects have been held to create enforceable rights on the part of persons purporting to represent such
interests; but frequently such findings of standing have been made
in the context of statutes containing explicit provisions for judicial
review.173 It is another question whether general policy statements
may be so used in the context of the public-lands decisions of the
Department of the Interior, for there the review sought is nonstatutory and the statement of general policy, if any, must be found
in some statute other than that which grants judicial review. In the
public-lands context, then, courts may still find persuasive the traditional requirement that a plaintiff's claim must be a personal one
in order for him to have standing to challenge the administrative
action in a judicial proceeding. Dictum in a recent Supreme Court
case indicates that this distinction may not be material, 174 but the
question must be regarded as, at best, unsettled.

2. Sovereign Immunity
The existence of standing and a legal right does not ensure the
availability of judicial review. Another potential obstacle to judicial
907 (1964) (suit by permittee under Taylor Grazing Act entertained, even though
statute provides that he acquires "no right, title, interest, or estate in or to the
lands''); McNeil v. Seaton, 281 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (plaintiff permitted to claim
preferential right to a permit under Taylor Grazing Act); Oman v. United States, 179
F.2d 738 (10th Cir. 1949) (same); Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308 (D.C.
Cir. 1938) (suit by an "interim permittee" under the Taylor Grazing Act permitted).
See also Chapman v. Sheriday-Wyoming Coal Co., 338 U.S. 621 (1950), in which the
Supreme Court found "no need" to discuss the question of standing in a suit by a
coal-mining lessee to enjoin the Secretary from issuing a similar lease on adjacent
property in alleged violation of a regulation.
171. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 38 U.S.L.W.
4193, 4194 (U.S. March 3, 1970). See also Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1
(1968); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
172. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 38 U.S.L.W.
4193, 4195 (U.S. March 3, 1970).
173. See, e.g., Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), afjd., No. 34,010 (2d Cir. April 16, 1970), 297 F. Supp. 809 (S.D.N.Y.)
(permanent injunction), affd., No. 33,371 (2d Cir., March 19, 1969); Udall v. FPC, 387
U.S. 428 (1967); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965).
174. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 38 U.S.L.W.
4193, 4194 (U.S. March 3, 1970).
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review of public-land disputes is the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
under which one cannot sue the sovereign without its consent. Since
in nonstatutory review specific consent is almost by definition lacking, creativity and gamesmanship may be required to avoid the
vague contours of that doctrine and to entice the judiciary into
considering the merits of a case. Reams of comment critical of the
doctrine have been written; 175 but until there is statutory change,
the sovereign remains immune. Hence, for the present at least, the
game must continue to be played.
An examination of the doctrine must begin with Larson v.
Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corporation, 176 the case which
provides the "modern keystone of the sovereign immunity doctrine."177 In that case, plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to enjoin the
War Assets Administrator from selling to a third party surplus coal
claimed by the plaintiff under a contract. In denying relief on the
ground of sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court in a divided
opinion held that even though an official's action may have been in
error, relief is still barred by sovereign immunity if the act is in the
area of the general authority of the official.178 If it could be said
with assurance that Congress, in delegating administrative power,
had intended to authorize officials to commit error or wrongful
acts so long as those acts are within the general sphere of the official's authority, Larson's holding in this regard would be less
troublesome. But presumably Congress does not intend to grant such
sweeping delegations except when it expressly commits a broad area
of authority to agency discretion. The Larson approach seems to
result in a blurring of the distinction between limited delegations
of administrative authority and the more general commissions of
authority to agency discretion. Thus, under the Larson approach,
if a court in its initial perusal of a relevant statute finds an indication
that the official's action was within his general authority, the inquiry
stops there, and no real attempt is made to ascertain whether the
statute was actually intended so to commit the action to agency
discretion.17° The Larson version of sovereign immunity interlocks
with an exception to review that is contained in the AP A to form a
broad front that denies judicial consideration of the merits of controversies. Most nonstatutory review is sought under section IO of
175. See, e.g., Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review:
Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1479 (1962)
[hereinafter Byse]; Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action:
The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction,
and Parties Defendant, 68 MICH. L. REv. 387 (1970) [hereinafter Cramton].
176. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
177. Cramton 406.
178, 337 U.S. at 695.
179. Cramton 406-08; Byse 1490-91.
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the APA,180 which specifically precludes review of actions "committed to agency discretion."181 A finding under that section that a
given act is committed to agency discretion would have an effect
similar to that of invoking sovereign immunity, for if the official's
act is discretionary, it is difficult to show the departure from legal
authority that is necessary to avoid sovereign immunity. It might be
thought that one reason why Congress excluded discretionary acts
from review was a reluctance to disturb the doctrine of sovereign
immunity as it existed at the time the AP A was enacted. But the
subsequent Larson decision fundamentally altered the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. That decision has had the effect of permitting
courts to bypass the need for any real examination of whether a
function is truly committed by statute to agency discretion, with
the result that in many instances, the black-letter "presumption of
reviewability"182 may be rendered an empty maxim supplanted by
the Larson fiction. Even though courts have sometimes held that
the APA itself constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity in cases
to which that Act applies,183 a general application of the Larson
version of sovereign immunity may instead prevent the APA from
applying. The circularity is distressing, but is representative of the
confusion which surrounds the question of sovereign immunity. 184
Other aspects of Larson complicate the subject further. Under
that decision, the test of whether sovereign immunity is a bar turns
on the rubric of whether the suit is "in effect a suit against the
sovereign" which would leave the "government ... stopped in its
tracks." 185 But it is a fiction to assert that suits against federal officers are not in effect against the Government, for it is clear that in
most cases it is the Government, not its employee, against whom the
complaint is directed. 186 That the Government should not be
stopped in its tracks is not generally disputed, but cases in this area
demonstrate that the rhetoric does not furnish the courts with an
adequate guide. 187
180. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). Types of review proceedings are discussed in text accompanying notes 196-230 infra.
181. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
182. JAFFE 336-53.
183. See, e.g., Estrada v. Ahrens, 296 F.2d 690, 698 (5th Cir. 1969); Adams v. Witmer,
271 F.2d 29, 34 (9th Cir. 1958). But see Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512, 515-16 (1952).
184. The Supreme Court has recognized that even prior to Larson the law of
sovereign immunity was an area of great confusion. Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643,
646 (1962). It seems doubtful that Larson and later cases have alleviated that con•
fusion. See Cramton 424.
185. 337 U.S. at 687, 704.
186. Cramton 399, 410-11.
187. Despite the admonition, it is clear that many cases do in fact stop the Government in its tracks if the underlying dispute appears important enough to the court.
See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (method of withdrawing security
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Sovereign immunity according to Larson erects other barriers
to judicial review. If escape from the doctrine is sought in the traditional manner of casting the suit against the officer rather than
against the Government, application of immunity may depend upon
an examination of the hypothetical question of whether there would
be vicarious liability if the officer were a private agent and the Government a private principal. If a private principal would be liable,
the suit must fail, for it is then in essence against the sovereign.188
Aside from the dubious relevance of agency law to judicial review
of administrative actions, 189 this test produces some perplexing questions of application. If a governmental official's vulnerability to suit
turns on his "authority," how is that authority to be ascertained?
In private agency cases, an agent may acquire authority by oral
direction, by the principal's acquiescence, or by mere appearance. 190
But the pertinent inquiry in review of administrative action should
be whether the act in question was authorized by law. When applied to cases involving public-lands agencies of the Department of
the Interior, the problem is further complicated by the question of
how to treat the unpublished internal regulations of the agency. If
an act is authorized for private agency purposes by such internal direction, presumably the action must then be characterized as one
against the sovereign, whether or not the "authorization" was consistent with statute or published regulation. Moreover, if the act
complained of falls within the agency's general area of authority, it
seems clear from Larson that the suit must fail, and the central
question of whether the act was wrongful is not even considered.
Another aspect of sovereign immunity which may pose particular
problems for judicial review of actions of public-lands agencies is
the Larson court's cryptic footnote indicating that a suit "may" fail
if the relief sought would require affirmative action by the sovereign.191 Application of that footnote can mean that even when a
governmental official unlawfully seizes a plaintiff's land, the plaintiff cannot obtain specific relief, but is limited to a damage remedy,
notwithstanding traditions of equity respecting the inadequacy of
damages in lands cases.192
clearance). Yet the rhetoric remains to trap those who are less sophisticated in the
tactics of evasion. See generally Cramton 420·23.
188. 337 U.S. 682, 692-95 (1949); accord, Hudspeth County Conservation & Reclamation Dist. No. 1 v. Robbins, 213 F.2d 425, 432 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 833
(1954).
189. See Cramton 409.
190. See, e.g., Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1960).
191. 337 U.S. at 691 n.11.
192. See, e.g., Simons v. Vinson, 394 F.2d 732 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 968
(1968); Switzerland Co. v. Udall, 337 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914
(1965).
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Against the backdrop of sovereign immunity there is lent some
hope to litigants-and more confusion to everyone-by the longstanding tradition of limited judicial review in public-lands cases. 193
Prior to Larson, sovereign immunity was a bar in only a limited
range of lands cases; 194 and even in the wake of Larson, the Supreme
Court has not invoked the doctrine in any lands case which involved
review of administrative decisions. 195 Although sovereign immunity
has been applied by the Court in cases in which some lands interests
of the United States have been involved, notably Malone v. Bowdoin196 and Dugan v. Rank, 197 those cases, it has been suggested, cannot properly be characterized as public-lands cases because they did not
arise out of administrative determinations of lands agency officials.198
In cases involving review of administrative decisions concerning the
public lands, the Court has failed to invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity, even though the lands interests of the United States
may have been directly affected. In Udall v. Talman, 199 for example,
the plaintiff alleged that the Secretary of the Interior had wrongfully refused to issue to the plaintiff oil and gas leases for certain
federal lands; and the Court denied mandamus relief, not on the
fundamental ground of sovereign immunity, but instead on the
basis of a thorough interpretation of the applicable statute.
But despite the argument that public-lands cases such as Talman
comprise an existential category of cases to which the sovereign immunity doctrine does not apply, 200 that characterization has not
been explicitly recognized by the courts. Indeed, since Larson, lower
courts have applied the sovereign immunity doctrine in publiclands cases, albeit sporadically.201 The resulting confusion that sur193. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882). See generally Peck, Judicial
Review of Administrative Actions of the Bureau of Land Management and Secretary
of the Interior, 9 ROCKY l\fT. MINERAL L. REv. 225, 252 (1964); Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: Some Conclusions
from the Public Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. REv. 867 (1970) (hereinafter Scalia].
194. The doctrine was applied in cases in which states sought to invoke the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court [e.g., Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60
(1906)], and in cases instituted by Indians challenging the administration of tribal
lands held in trust by the United States [e.g., Naganab v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 473
(1906)).
•
195. Apparently Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 481 (1925), was the last occasion on
which the Supreme Court invoked the sovereign immunity doctrine to defeat review
of an administrative decision of a land agency. Scalia 903.
196. 369 U.S. 643 (1962) (Court held that suit to eject Forest Service officer from
plaintiff's land was barred by sovereign immunity.).
197. 372 U.S. 609 (1963) (Court held that suit by downstream landowner to enjoin
Bureau of Reclamation from impounding water was barred by sovereign immunity).
198. Scalia 909-12.
199. 380 U.S. I (1965).
200. Scalia 882-909.
201. Compare Simons v. Vinson, 394 F.2d 732 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 968
(1968) (suit to quiet title to accreted land held to be barred), Ward v. Humble
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rounds the entire question of sovereign immunity is such that
litigants in this area cannot with certainty rely upon any line of
precedent. As a practical matter, whether sovereign immunity will
bar relief may depend upon whether the Government includes the
doctrine in a shotgun defense, upon the skill of plaintiff's counsel in
evading the doctrine, and upon the sophistication of the court.202
In all cases, however, the doctrine remains a potential hazard for
litigants, one of a plethora of problems facing those who seek to
challenge administrative action.
The time-honored device for evading sovereign immunity is the
officer's suit, in which the aggrieved party casts his suit against the
administrative officer responsible for the injury or violation, rather
than against the Government itself. In the past the necessity of so
phrasing the complaint caused many problems when the plaintiff
made the error of suing the ·wrong officer or describing the defendant by his official title rather than by name. 203 Further problems
arose if the named defendant's term of office expired in the course
of the proceedings. In addition, for many years, actions for mandamus or in the nature of mandamus could be brought only in the
District of Columbia, whose courts, by virtue of having inherited
the equity and common-law powers of the courts of Maryland, possessed powers not held by other federal courts.204 Recent years, however, have seen the elimination of many of these barriers. The
Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962205 permits mandamus actions to
be brought against federal officers in any federal district court; and
the liberal amendment and service-of-process provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,206 together with provisions for naming
the defendant in his official capacity and for the substitution of sueOil &: Ref. Co., 321 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1963), and Seifert v. Udall, 280 F. Supp. 443
(D. Mont. 1968), with Zager v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 396 (E.D. Wis. 1966) (title
action stemming from resurvey of land ordered by Secretary of the Interior, held to
be not barred), and Clackamas County v. McKay, 219 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1954),
vacated as moot, 349 U.S. 909 (1955). See also Brown v. Udall, 325 F.2d 706 (D.C. Cir.
1964) (declaratory judgment holding invalid Secretary's rejection of mineral lease application); Foster v. Udall, 335 F.2d 828 (10th Cir. 1964); Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d
29 (9th Cir. 1958) (enjoined cancellation of grant of mining claim; reversed lower
court's holding that sovereign immunity barred relief); McKay v. Whalenmaier, 226
F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (mandamus issued ordering substitution of one oil and gas
lease for another).
202. See generally Cramton 420-21.
203. See, e.g., Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969); cf. Bell v.
Groak, 371 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1966); CORE v. Commissioner, 270 F. Supp. 537 (D. Md.
1967).
204. The explanation for this power of the District's courts is that the District was
carved from the state of Maryland. See Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37
U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
205. 28 u.s.c. § 1391 (1964).
206. FED. R. CIV. P. 15.
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cessors in office,207 have helped a great deal. 208 Fortunately for litigants in public-lands cases, statutes of limitation have seldom been
a problem because when review is nonstatutory, there usually is
no applicable statute of limitations; 209 and the only time-bar defense,
other than the court's discretionary power to dismiss for delay, is
that of equitable laches.210
Most cases for nonstatutory review in this area are brought
under the APA. In those proceedings, the plaintiff sues the federal
officer, claiming that his statutory rights or privileges have been illegally denied by the officer. The relief sought is either an injunction or a declaratory judgment.211 But since sovereign immunity
may prevent the granting of affirmative relief, 212 it may be advisable
that plaintiff's prayer for relief be phrased in negative terms.
Whether a court will countenance granting affirmative relief in a
negative guise is another area of uncertainty upon which the litigant
must gamble.
In light of that uncertainty, the plaintiff might prefer to seek
affirmative relief by mandamus rather than through an injunction
or a declaratory judgment.213 It appears, however, that the scope of
relief available in an action for mandamus is narrower than it is in
the other types of actions, since, under traditional formulations, only
a "ministerial" act may be compelled, not acts involving some discretion.214 Moreover, actions in the nature of mandamus may not
be available when the federal officer has interfered with the plaintiff's rights, unless it also can be shown that the officer "owed a
duty" to the plaintiff.215 In contrast, injunctive or declaratory relief
may be available even if the act sought or complained of involves
207. FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d)(l), (2).
208. Prior to 1966, it was possible that the time delay involved in amending a
complaint might operate to defeat an action, but the possibility of such a dismissal
has been reduced by the change in 1966 of rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, permitting amendments in pleadings to relate back to the date of the
original pleading. The liberal amendment provisions, however, have eliminated only
the consequences of suing the wrong officer; they have not entirely done away with
the problem of determining which officer to sue.
209. An exception to this generalization is found in the Mineral Leasing Act, 30
U.S.C. § 226-2 (1964), which requires that any action for judicial review must be commenced within ninety days of the final administrative decision.
210. See .Brennan v. Udall, 379 F.2d 803, 807-08 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
975 (1967).
211. 28 u.s.c. § 2201 (1964).
212. See text accompanying note 191 supra.
213. One important advantage of a mandamus action brought under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361 (1964) is that the plaintiff need not demonstrate that the case meets the
$10,000 jurisdictional amount of 28 U.S.C. § 133l(a) (1964).
214. See generally Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of
1962 and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARV.
L. REv. 308 (1967).
215. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964); .Byse & Fiocca, supra note 214.
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some discretion, for under the APA only those acts committed to
agency discretion are unreviewable. 216 As has been seen, however,
that distinction may not get a chance to operate if sovereign immunity is triggered simply on a showing of "general" authority.217
Another way in which a litigant may avoid the bar of sovereign
immunity is by persuading the Government to initiate the suit. If
the administrative determination is one which requires the claimant
to take some action such as surrendering possession, he can simply
refuse and wait to defend himself on the merits in a suit initiated
by the Govemment.218 That course of action, however, may require
expenditures of time and money in maintaining the property-a
problem particularly troublesome if the law under which the individual is claiming the land requires development or construction
as a condition to the claim. Moreover, a litigant selecting this course
of action runs the risk that he may subject himself to civil liabilities
if the land has been awarded to another claimant, who initiates
suit.210
A third course of action sometimes available to a disappointed
claimant is to sue the party to whom the land has been awarded.
That practice is employed fairly frequently, and the issues may
sometimes be decided in state courts.220 However, it seems that a
usual prerequisite to such a proceeding is the issuance of a patent
by the Govemment; 221 and a claimant who waits that long to initiate suit runs the risk that the patentee will defeat the claim by
transfering the land to a bona fide purchaser.222 Moreover, if the
decision upon which the complainant bases his claim does not call
for the issuance of a patent, the action will never ripen for this type
of review. 223
216. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). For a general discussion of this distinction, see Sperling &: Cooney, Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions Under
the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 1 LAND &: WATER L. REv. 433, 434-38 (1966).
217. See text accompanying note 178 supra.
218. That right is explicitly recognized in section IO(b) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 703
(Supp. IV, 1965-1968): "Except to the extent that prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for judicial review is provided by law, agency action is subject to judicial
review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial enforcement." But recognition of
that right predates the APA. See, e.g., United States v. Detroit Timber &: Lumber Co.,
200 U.S. 321, 338 (1906).
219. See generally McFARLAND 188.
220. See, e.g., Crowder v. Lyle, 225 Cal. App. 2d 439, 37 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1964). But
if the action involves a federal officer and seeks specific relief or is based solely on
federal law, a state forum probably will not be able to grant relief. See generally
Arnold, The Power of State Courts To Enjoin Federal Officials, 73 YALE L.J. 1385
(1964).
221. See, e.g., Brown v. Hitchcock, 173 U.S. 473 (1899); cf. Borax Consol., Ltd. v.
Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935). See generally McFARLAND 186-87.
222. See McFARLAND 186.
223. See generally McFARLAND 188 &: n.269.
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In those situations in which a claimant seeks to sue the party
to whom the land has been awarded, but cannot bring the action in
a state court because the patent has not been issued, 224 the claimant
may find that relief in the federal courts-at least in the federal
district court-is also unavailable. Prior to the passage of the Mandamus and Venue Act in 1962, governmental officers could be sued
in the district courts only if they could be reached for service of
process. If it was determined that a superior officer was an indispensable party,225 and if a plaintiff could not effect service of process
upon that officer, it was necessary for him to bring his suit in the
District of Columbia where that superior officer could be served.
The Mandamus and Venue Act lessened this problem by providing
for nationwide service of process upon the necessary federal officers.226 But the liberalized service and venue provisions are available only when each defendant is an officer or employee of the
United States. 227 Hence, if the nature of a suit is such that it is
necessary to join as defendants both federal officers and persons who
are not federal officers, a plaintiff probably will be unable to bring
his suit in the district court unless all federal officers who are indispensable parties can be served with process without aid of the liberalized provision.228 A major problem in this connection is to
determine who is an indispensable party. The traditional rubric
for determining when a superior officer is an indispensable party is
whether "the decree granting the relief sought will require [the
official] to take action, either by exercising directly a power lodged
in him, or by having a subordinate exercise it for him." 220 In light
of the vagaries and obfuscations which are likely to be encountered
in an attempt to unravel the lines of authority in the administrative
structure of the Department of the Interior, it seems that most plaintiffs faced with the predicament would be best advised simply to
forego suit in the district court and seek relief by other means.230
224. See notes 220-21 supra.
225. For the traditional test for determining whether a party is indispensable, see
text accompanying note 229 infra.
226. 28 U.S.C. § 139l(e) (1964).
227. 28 U.S.C. § 139l(e) (1964).
228. See generally McFARLAND 189, 305; Cramton 463-65.
229. Williams v. Fanning, 332 U.S. 490, 493 (1947).
230. See generally McFARLAND 263-88; Sperling &: Cooney, supra note 216, at 4!H
nn.24-25. There is some case precedent which can serve as a guide to when the
Secretary is an indispensable party. Compare Thomas v. Union P. R.R., 139 F. Supp.
588 (D. Colo.), affd. per curiam, 239 F.2d 641 (10th Cir. 1956) (Secretary indispensable
in action to compel issuance of patent), and Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Smith, 165
U.S. 28 (1897) (Secretary indispensable in action to compel issuance of lease), with
Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Pierson, 284 F.2d 649 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 936 (1961) (Secretary not indispensable in action to enjoin cancellation of
lease).
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3. Jurisdictional Problems
Another obstacle to the claimant, contestant, or protestant who
seeks review of an administrative decision respecting public lands
is the requirement that he show that the amount in controversy is
sufficient to obtain federal-question jurisdiction under section 1331
(a) of title 28 of the United States Code.231 In public-lands cases,
that amount is determined by reference not to the value of the land
itself, but to the value of the plaintiff's interest which is the subject
of the controversy. Such value, however, may be difficult to determine in cases involving, for example, the value of a cloud on the
title 232 or the value of the enjoyment of recreation or wilderness.
Even if a plaintiff is able to determine the value of the interest in
controversy, in many public-lands cases that amount is less than
the requisite 10,000 dollars, as, for example, in a suit challenging a
grant of grazing rights233 or in a suit challenging an allegedly wrongful enforcement of grazing regulations.234 A plaintiff may be able to
escape the problem simply by asserting that he meets the jurisdictional requirements, 235 but he should not place too much reliance
upon the possibility that the court will accept his assertion at face
value.236
A plaintiff might also evade the jurisdictional-amount requirement by bringing suit in the District of Columbia and thus taking
advantage of the inherited equity power of that jurisdiction, which
may be exercised without regard to the amount in controversy.237
But that device has its own built-in cost limitation because if the
amount in controversy does not satisfy the requirements for federalquestion jurisdiction, it is unlikely to be economically feasible for
the plaintiff, who may be a Montanan sheep grazer or an Alaskan
homesteader, to bring suit in the District of Columbia.
An alternative method for avoiding jurisdictional-amount prob231. 28 U.S.C. § 133l(a) (1964) provides: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $10,000 exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States."
232. See, e.g., Cameron v. United States, 146 U.S. 533 (1892) Ourisdictional amount
must be determined not by value of land itself, but by value of color of title to
property).
233. Helvy v. Webb, 36 F. Supp. 243 (S.D. Cal. 1941) (value of grazing rights).
234. Gavica v. Donaugh, 93 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1937) (enforcement of grazing
regulations).
235. Cf. Townsend v. Zimmerman, 237 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956) (selective-service
classification). But see Boyd v. Clark, 287 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.J. 1968).
236. See notes 232-34 supra; 28 U.S.C. § 133l(b) (1964) (assessment of costs on
plaintiff if judgment does not meet requirements for jurisdictional amount); cf. Carroll v. Sommerville, II6 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1941). See generally Cramton 437-41.
237. See text accompanying note 204 supra; Cramton 442-43; cf. R.H. Macy Co. v.
Tinley, 249 F. Supp. 778 (D.D.C. 1965).
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!ems is for the plaintiff to base jurisdiction on some ground other
than federal-question jurisdiction. One possibility is the Declaratory
Judgment Act, 238 but the language of that statute does not seem to
furnish an independent basis of jurisdiction.239 An independent
basis of jurisdiction is available under the Mandamus and Venue
Act, 240 but that basis is effective only if the plaintiff can fit his case
within the technicalities and limitations of the mandamus remedy.241
A final possibility for evading the jurisdictional-amount limitation
is to predicate jurisdiction on section 10 of the APA. Unlike the
Declaratory Judgment Act, that statute does not expressly limit itself to situations otherwise within the court's jurisdiction; instead,
it makes reference only to "a court of competent jurisdiction,"242 a
common bit of statutory boilerplate which seems to beg the question. But although some cases have held that section 10 does provide
an independent source of jurisdiction,243 the weight of authority is
to the contrary.244 Nevertheless, it seems that a narrow construction
of section 10 is not consistent with what is arguably the spirit of the
APA. That Act aims to expand the availability of review of administrative actions, whereas a narrow construction of section 10 tends
to restrict review by permitting it only to the extent that (1) other
statutes provide jurisdiction, (2) other statutes do not preclude judicial review, 245 and (3) the agency action is not one committed by
law to agency discretion.246
238. 28 u.s.c. § 2201 (1964).
239. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964) (emphasis added) provides that "any court of the
United States .•• may declare the rights and legal relations of any interested party
seeking such declaration" but apparently only "[i]n a case of actual controversy
within its jurisdiction." Occasionally, however, courts seem to view the Declaratory
Judgment Act as providing an independent source of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Henrikson
v. Udall, 229 F. Supp. 510 (N.D. Cal. 1964), afjd., 350 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 940 (1966) (mining claim); Freeman v. Brown, 342 F.2d 205 (5th Cir.
1965) (tobacco marketing quotas). See generally Byse &: Fiocca, supra note 214, at 329.
240. 28 u.s.c. § 1361 (1964).
241. See text accompanying notes 214-17 supra and text accompanying notes 311-14
infra. See also Cramton 443.
242. 5 U.S.C. § 703 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
243. Brennan v. Udall, 379 F.2d 803 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 975 (1967);
Coleman v. United States, 363 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1966), afjd. on rehearing, 379 F.2d
555 (1967), revd. on other grounds, 390 U.S. 599 (1968) (validity of mining claim);
Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1958); cf. Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1
(2d Cir. 1966); McEachem v. United States, 321 F.2d 31 (4th Cir. 1963); Estrada v.
Ahrens, 296 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1961). See generally Byse &: Fiocca, supra note 214, at
330-31; Scalia 920-24.
244. Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d
529 (8th Cir. 1967) (validity of tribal election); Choumos v. United States, 335 F.2d 918
(10th Cir. 1964) (validity of mining claim); cf. Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v.
Floete, 278 F.2d 912 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 894 (1960); Kansas City Power &:
Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955). See
generally Byse &: Fiocca, supra note 214, at 330-31; Scalia 920-24.
245. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(l), (2) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
246. 5 U.S.C. § 70I(a)(l), (2) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
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4. Ripeness and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Assuming that a person aggrieved by a decision of the Department of the Interior can demonstrate the existence of a legal right
upon which to base standing, can avoid sovereign immunity, and
can satisfy jurisdictional requirements, judicial review on the merits
is still not available unless the controversy is "ripe" for review and
the aggrieved person has exhausted his administrative remedies.247
The concept of "ripeness" may include various factors, including
whether there is a justiciable controversy, whether there is standing,
whether administrative remedies have been exhausted, and whether
the injury complained of is imminent enough to warrant judicial
intervention.248 The concept is vague at best, and its application to
public-lands disputes appears uncertain. Most of the cases on the
subject seem to turn on the question of whether there is a justiciable
case or controversy; 249 but it has been suggested that those cases,
decided in a constitutional context, can be explained by the Supreme Court's reluctance to decide questions of constitutional significance until truly necessary. 250 So viewed, such cases do not furnish an adequate guide as to when administrative actions not
involving constitutional issues should be reviewable. 251
It has been further suggested that the judicial insistence that
there be a matured controversy between adverse parties may be misplaced when applied in the administrative context. With regard to
federal regulatory activities, such judicial reluctance may perpetuate
harmful uncertainty among those regulated; 252 likewise, in the public-lands area, doubt concerning the legal validity of a regulation or
a classification may create uncertainty among those who seek to use
or develop the land. For example, an arguably invalid classification
decision to withdraw lands from availability for mineral development may create uncertainty among potential developers; yet if a
strict approach to ripeness is applied, there can be no review of the
proposed classification unless and until someone has been willing
to go through a tedious, lengthy, perhaps expensive, and probably
futile application process253 in order to create an issue "ripe" for
review. In other areas, "ripeness" has sometimes been found at an
early stage in the administrative proceedings, as it has in general
247. See generally JAFFE 424.
248. JAFFE 395-98.
249. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
See generally JAFFE 395.
250. JAFFE 397.
251. Id. There is some suggestion that "justiciability" in the constitutional context
is an entirely different term of art from "justiciability" in the context of judicial review. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 38 U.S.L.W.
4193, 4199 n.3 (U.S. March 3, 1970) (dissenting opinion).
252. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 21.01 (1958) [hereinafter DAVIS].
253. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
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designations of organizations as Communist; 254 but classifications
and adjudications in the public-lands areas seem to lack such immediate impact and appeal to the judiciary. Decisions denying judicial review of public-lands decisions seldom turn upon the ripeness
issue, probably because there are so many other bases available on
which to refuse review,255 and perhaps because if a person is sufficiently aggrieved to hazard an assault on the many barriers to judicial
review, the issue at hand is probably very ripe indeed. Moreover,
in the few instances in which a decision in this area has turned upon
the ripeness issue, reliance on that issue appears to have been misplaced, with the real objection based on sovereign immunity, a lack
of standing, or a lack of jurisdiction.256
Clearly there is a place for the ripeness factor in considering
whether to grant judicial review of decisions in the public-lands area.
But it should be a small niche, with invocation of the doctrine occuring only after a thorough balancing of the considerations involved, including, on the one hand, the hardship which could result
from a denial of judicial relief257 and the possibility that delay might
result in compounding damages, 258 and, on the other hand, the inappropriateness and difficulty of judicial disposition at an early
stage.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies may present a more
troublesome problem. Under general notions of administrative law,
a prerequisite to judicial review is the exhaustion of administrative
· remedies. 259 Some exceptions are made, however, when the challenge is on constitutional grounds260 or is one alleging that the entire administrative rule-making apparatus is illegal.261 Additional
exceptions may be available when it can be sho-wn that further administrative redress would be futile 262 or that the decision complained of will cause immediate and irreparable injury.263
254. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
255. Those bases include the lack of a legal right, lack of standing, lack of juris•
diction, sovereign immunity, and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
256. See, e.g., Delaware Valley Conservation Assn. v. Resor, 392 F.2d 331 (3d Cir.
1968) (action to enjoin Army Corps of Engineers' reservoir project dismissed for lack
of ripeness) (alternative holding); cf. Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931) (reser•
voir); Jasper v. Sawyer, 205 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (airport).
257. That flexible approach is favored by Jaffe. See JAFFE 423.
258. Thus if ripeness had been the only reason for denying relief in Delaware
Conservation Assn. v. Resor, 392 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1968), deferring relief until the
project was completed could have caused both irreparable harm and the compounding
of whatever damages were threatened.
259. See generally DAVIS §§ 20.01-.10.
260. See, e.g., Public Util. Commn. v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958). See generally DAVIS § 20.04; JAFFE 438-40.
261. See, e.g., Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U.S. 557 (1919). See gen•
erally JAFFE 426-28.
262. JAFFE 446-49.
263. JAFFE 429-32.
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Whether all available appeal procedures must have been pursued prior to seeking judicial relief is a matter of some doubt.
Apparently, administrative appeal is necessary unless the initial decision is considered final, 264 and "final" decisions seem to be those
which are immediately operative.265 If a party seeks judicial review
only to discover that he has failed to exhaust administrative remedies, he may find himself without any forum for review of the
offending decision, because administrative appeal may have been
foreclosed by the delay which occurred while judicial review was
being prematurely sought and because judicial review may be conditioned upon compliance with administrative appeal procedures.266
The application of the foregoing general rules to public-lands
decisions of the Department of the Interior is only partly clear. At
least it is clear that exhaustion of appeal procedures is necessary,
since initial orders are generally not effective during appeal. 267 The
regulations provide, however, that the officer to whom the appeal is
taken may in his discretion provide that a decision, or a part of it,
be immediately effective.268 Whether such orders assume the posture
of a final decision for purposes of judicial review is not clear; presumably the answer depends on the effect that the decision will have
upon the applicant and on whether the applicant can show that irreparable damage will result from the decision. Because failure to
pursue administrative appeals can result in a denial both of judicial
relief and of any subsequent administrative recourse, persons dealing with the BLM should adhere closely to the strict provisions and ·
practices concerning the filing deadlines for appeal. 269
In some instances, however, it is less clear how the exhaustion
requirement applies to a decision of the Department of the Interior.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies presupposes that the plaintiff has knowledge of how he is to pursue those remedies. But, as has
264. Under the APA, only "final" administrative determinations are subject to
judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
265. See DAVIS § 20.08.
266. See JAFFE 450.
267. 43 C.F.R. § 1840.0-9(a) (1969).
268. 43 C.F.R. § 1840.0-9(a) (1969).
269. The provisions for summary dismissal are strictly enforced. See text accompanying notes 63-65 supra. Moreover, even if the local official grants an extension for
filing, the appellant would be well advised to adhere to the letter of the regulations
and not to rely on any such purported extension. The Bureau's internal regulations
do not authorize agents to grant extensions of time for appeal, and an appeal in
reliance on such an extension may still suffer summary dismissal. See Ollie ·w. Brooks,
66 Interior Dec. 108 (1959). Occasionally courts express dismay with such cavalier
treatment. See, e.g., Tagula v. Gorsuch, 411 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1969), in which a departmental official had exercised his power of summary dismissal for failure to file an
appeal memorandum within the required thirty days. The court found that summary
dismissal was entirely discretionary; but because the appeal had been dismissed outright, the court remanded with instructions that before dismissing, considered discretion must be exercised.
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been indicated, there may be some difficulty in determining both
the lines of authority within the Department and the means and
requirements for prosecuting an administrative appeal.270 The problem may become particularly acute if the rights and interests in
question are those of a third party. In the first place, it is not clear
whether a third party will be allowed to participate in an initial
proceeding: if it is a hearing-type proceeding, he may be accorded
status as an intervenor; if it is not a hearing proceeding, he may
merely get a chance to make his position knmvn to the examining
officer. A third party's status in an administrative appeal is even
more uncertain: for appeal to the Director, he must be an "aggrieved party to the case" who is "adversely affected"; 271 for appeal
to the Secretary, he must be only an "aggrieved party ... adversely
affected." 272 If the third party is denied standing for administrative
appeal, presumably he has exhausted his administrative remedies,
thus meeting one requirement for judicial review. Assuming that he
can also meet the standing requirement and the other requirements
for judicial review, the question that then arises is what the reviewing court should do. Since the scope of review is generally limited
to issues and facts raised in administrative proceedings,273 the probable decision of the court-if other than dismissal-would be to
remand to the agency for further proceedings. Following another
administrative appeal, the aggrieved party, if still not satisfied, presumably could again seek judicial review, this time on the merits,
at least with respect to those issues raised in the administrative proceedings.

5. Scope of Review
Assuming that a claimant, contestant, or protestant is able to
overcome all obstacles and obtain judicial consideration, he must
then face the problem of what will be the scope of the review
granted. In general, that review is sharply limited with respect to
factual determinations and only slightly less so with respect to legal
determinations.
a. APA proceedings. The scope of review in APA proceedings is
covered generally by section IO(e) of that Act, under which the
court is authorized to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld
or unreasonably delayed" 274 and to "hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary,
capricious, in abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

See text accompanying notes 131-35 supra.
See text accompanying note 119 supra.
See text accompanying note 120 supra.
See text accompanying notes 274-314 infra.
5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
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with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right ... ; (C) in excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitation, or short of statutory
rights; (D) without observance of procedure required by law; (E)
unsupported by substantial evidence [if the case is one in which an
administrative hearing was required by statute] ... or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject
to trial de nova by the reviewing court."275
The foregoing provisions, however, are applicable only to the
extent that (1) statutes do not preclude review of the agency action, 276 or (2) the agency action is not one committed by law to
agency discretion.277 Because review of decisions made by the Department of the Interior is almost entirely nonstatutory, there is
seldom a special statute precluding review of such decisions. The
second exception, however, poses a greater problem; indeed,
whether a decision is one committed to agency discretion is frequently the central issue in actions for judicial review. The Department of the Interior has long argued that its determinations are
entirely discretionary and that "Congress has delegated to the Secretary the plenary authority to dispose of the public lands as he may
direct." 278 Undeniably the discretion delegated to the Secretary of
the Interior is immense,279 and courts have occasionally described
his power over the public lands as "plenary."280 But few courts have
been willing to view that power as being so extensive that the Secretary is exempt from AP A review; indeed, some courts, particularly
in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, have occasionally sought a liberal
application of AP A review. 281 But even if the agency action in question is found to have been one which is not entirely committed to
agency discretion, with the result that APA review is available, the
scope of that review is still limited by judicial deference to agency
discretion.
275. 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A)-(F) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
276. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(I) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
277. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
278. Brief for Appellee Stewart L. Udall at 34, Coleman v. United States, 363 F.2d
190 (9th Cir. 1966), afjd. on rehearing, 379 F.2d 555 (1967), revd. on other grounds, 390
U.S. 599 (1968), quoted in Parr, Government Initiated Contests Against Mining Claims
-A Continuing Conflict, 6 RocKY MT. MINERAL L. REv. I, 22 (1968).
279. A single statute, 43 U.S.C. § 1201 (1964), is cited by the Department as its
authority for promulgating a vast number of regulations [see, e.g., 43 C.F.R. pts. 1840,
1850, 2410 (1969)]. That statute authorized the Secretary, or such officer as he may
designate, to enforce and carry into execution by appropriate regulations every part
of the provisions of title 43 for which there is no other specific provision.
280. Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334 (1963).
281. See, e.g., Brennan v. Udall, 379 F.2d 803, 805 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 975 (1967); Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29, 33 (9th Cir. 1958). But cf. Ferry v.
Udall, 336 F.2d 706, 711-12 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 904 (1965). See gen•
erally Parr, supra note 278, at 23.
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With regard to questions of fact, section 10(e) of the AP A permits
courts to set aside agency action or findings which are "unsupported
by substantial evidence"282 if the agency's action was taken after a
hearing which met the formal requirements of sections 7 and 8 of
that Act. 283 But as has been stated, there are few Department of the
Interior adjudications in which such hearings are required.284 In
cases not subject to such hearings, it is not entirely clear what constitutes the factual record for the reviewing court, and section IO(e) is
silent in that respect. 285 The easy answer is simply to hold that if
no administrative hearing is required, the agency action is one committed to agency discretion and hence is unreviewable. In practice,
that approach may often be what is taken, since cases involving a
legal right created by statute are for the most part those for which
hearings are provided; and if there is no legal right, there is probably no standing to seek judicial review. Thus cases involving mere
refusals to grant applications for sales or permits may be considered
discretionary dispensations of a "government gratuity" and therefore
unreviewable.286
If that Draconian approach is rejected, as it often is, 287 the court
must face the question of what facts it should refer to on review.
Section IO(e) seems to anticipate trial de novo, 288 but at least with
respect to public-lands disputes, that device seems to be unknown.289
Instead, the reviewing courts generally tend to restrict themselves
to the administrative record, however that record may have been
determined.290 That restriction means that the plaintiff is limited to
whatever he has been able to accomplish in the administrative proceedings, in which he may have been at a pronounced disadvantage.
282. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
283. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-57 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
284. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
285. The "unsupported by substantial evidence" test also applies to a case "otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute," 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(E) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968); but that provision too furnishes little guide, for by
and large the Department of the Interior does not have "hearings provided by
statute." See text accompanying notes 145-55 supra.
286. See, e.g., Ferry v. Udall, 336 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 904
(1965) (refusal to sell lands to highest bidder at public auction held to be discretionary;
no legal rights created in highest bidder); Hamel v. Nelson, 226 F. Supp. 96 (N.D.
Cal. 1963) (rejection of request for patent).
287. See note 170 supra.
288. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) states that a court may set aside an
agency decision found to be "unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts
are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court."
289. See Couch v. Udall, 265 F. Supp. 848 (D. Okla. 1967); Noren v. Beck, 199 F.
Supp. 708 (S.D. Cal. 1961); cf. Coleman v. United States, 363 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1966),
afjd. on rehearing 379 F.2d 555 (1967), revd. on other grounds, 390 U.S. 599 (1968);
Duesing v. Udall, 350 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 912 (1965).
290. See McFARLAND 186.
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For example, even if a plaintiff had persuaded the officials to grant
him a discretionary hearing, he would not have had an opportunity
to submit a brief to the field commissioner or to see the commissioner's proposed finding which in all probability proved dispositive
of the case.291 Worse yet, if the factual determination was made by
the more common ex parte method, the applicant would not have
had the opportunity to confront, or even to hear testimony by, adverse witnesses, 292 nor would he have had the chance to know or
refute the manner by which factual determinations were made in
any investigations pending his departmental appeal.293 Yet the fruit
of such investigations appears in the departmental file, which must
provide the factual record for judicial review. It thus seems that
many, if not most, applicants dealing with the Department of the
Interior are at a severe disadvantage, with respect to factual issues,
throughout both administrative and judicial proceedings. Still, the
practice has been approved by at least one reviewing court.294
The "Freedom of Information Act" 295 may help to alleviate some
of these problems; it at least prevents application of previous decisions endorsing such administrative practices. The judicial posture
indicated in such decisions, however, exemplifies the deference
courts generally show to factual determinations by the Department.
In effect, that deference may be equivalent to holding that the action is one committed to agency discretion. The policy of deference
is a hoary one, traceable at least to Cameron v. United States, 296 in
which the Supreme Court held that factual determinations by the
Secretary of the Interior were "conclusive in the absence of fraud
or imposition."297 Although such language may still be troublesome
291. McCarty, supra note IO, at 176-77. See also text accompanying note 36 supra.
292. See, e.g., 43 C.F.R. § 1823.2-2 (1969):
[T]he testimony of each witness should be taken separate and apart from, and
not within the hearing of, either the applicant or of any other witness, and both
the applicant and each of the witnesses should be required to state in and as part
of the final proof testimony given by them that they have given such testimony
without any actual knowledge of any statement made in the testimony of • • •
others.
293. See McCarty, supra note IO, at 178, and the Interior Department decisions
cited therein. See also note 36 supra and accompanying text.
294. Robertson v. Udall, 349 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
295. 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1964), 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) provides that
"each agency, on request for identifiable records made in accordance with published
rules stating the time, place, fees to the extent authorized by statute, and procedure
to be followed, shall make the records promptly available to any person." The Act
grants district courts jurisdiction to enjoin agencies from withholding agency records;
and it further provides that such court actions for injunction shall be tried de novo,
that the burden is on the agency to sustain its action, and that such actions shall take
precedence over other cases on the court's docket.
296. 252 U.S. 450 (1920).
297. 252 U.S. at 464. See also United States ex rel. Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock,
190 U.S. 316 (1903).
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precedent, it probably does not adequately reflect the manner in
which courts today are likely to view factual determinations of the
Department. Apparently some distinction is made by the courts according to the purpose for which the departmental factual determination is made. If the function is essentially adjudicatory, such
as when the applicant has a statutory right to a certain disposition
upon proof of requisite facts, the findings of the Secretary may be
more closely examined by a reviewing court, even if, as under the
Mineral Leasing Act, 298 the statutory right is not one for which any
statute requires an administrative hearing.299 However, if the function is not essentially adjudicatory, but rather is one connected with
an adjudication of an application seeking an exercise of discretion
or policy, the deference accorded to the administrative determination seems to follow the established trail. 300
It may be stated with little fear of exaggeration that the primary
purpose of judicial review of administrative action is to guard
against departures by government officials from their legal authority
and thus to help ensure that the administration remains within the
legal bounds intended by the legislature. That precept is embodied
in the judicial-review provisions of the APA301 and is reflected in
the traditional form of review, the officer's suit, in which a departure
from law is alleged. Against that background, it may be somewhat
surprising to discover that courts accord deference to administrative
determinations not only on questions of fact, but, at least in the
public-lands area, on questions of law as well.
With respect to matters of statutory interpretation, it is frequently stated that "courts will not hesitate to review the Secretary's
interpretation to determine if it accords with the language of the
statute and the purpose of the statute, gleaned primarily from its
legislative history."302 But at the same time, it is said that the Secretary's construction is entitled to great weight and is not normally
overturned unless a different construction is plainly required.303
With respect to statutory interpretation by the Secretary, the latter
298. 30 u.s.c. §§ 181-287 (1964).
299. In some such cases, however-those dealing with the validity of mining claims
for example-the Department has ruled that APA-type hearings are to be used, even
though not required by statute. See Keith v. O'Leary, 63 Interior Dec. 341 (1956). See
also Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1958). See generally Sperling 8: Cooney,
supra note 216, at 446.
300. See, e.g., Palmer v. Dredge Corp., 398 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1968); Ferry v. Udall,
336 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 904 (1965); Hamel v. Nelson, 226
F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
301. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
302. Sperling 8: Cooney, supra note 216, at 444 8: n.84, citing, inter alia, Seaton v.
Texas Co., 256 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1958); California Oil Co. v. Udall, Civil No. 5729
(D.N.M., Jan. 15, 1965).
303. Sperllp.g 8: Cooney, supra :note 216, at 445.
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approach is difficult to fault, for it would clearly not be desirable if
large segments of public administration were subject to disruption
every time a court happened to prefer its own statutory interpretation to that of the Secretary.
It is with respect to interpretation of departmental regulations
that one begins to doubt the wisdom of according a broad deference
to the Secretary's interpretation. In this area, the Secretary is given
more deference than he is even for factual determinations; factual
determinations must be based on "substantial evidence," but interpretations of regulations may be upheld if there are "plausible
grounds" for the Secretary's interpretation.804 At first glance, it
might seem that interpretation of regulations is the area in which
deference is most appropriate-the problems may be complex, and
the administrative officers presumably have the familiarity and expertise to deal with those problems. Yet from the standpoint of
persons who must deal with the administrators and their interpretations, the picture is less clear. The Secretary is granted broad
powers to formulate regulations, and he may be bound by those
regulations. 305 Regulations are-or at any rate ought to be-more
specific than their authorizing statutes, and hence regulations can
provide courts with a convenient gauge from which to determine
whether an officer has exceeded his legal bounds. In view of what
appears to be the Department's long-standing distaste for judicial
review of its actions, 306 it might be expected that in formulating
regulations the Department would seek to furnish the courts with
as little room for interpretation as possible, at least with respect to
matters which border on policy. That indeed seems to be the case.
A few hours of wading through the Department's regulations suffice to convince one that much of the regulatory material is prolix
paraphrase of the underlying statute. True, in certain highly developed areas, such as grazing, the regulations are quite specific.307 But
in volatile areas which have strong policy implications, such as
classification, the regulations carefully go no further than does the
statute in restricting official discretion; 308 and with respect to the
segregation provisions, they seem even to expand upon the broad
discretion conferred by the statute.309 It is not an adequate answer
304. See, e.g., Udall v. Oelschlaeger, 389 F.2d 974 (D.C. Cir. 1968); cf. Udall v.
Tallman, 380 U.S. I (1965); Robertson v. Udall, 349 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Duesing
v. Udall, 350 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 912 (1965).
305. Cf. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959) (adherence by Secretary to his
regulations deprives him of the summary power that he would have had absent the
regulations).
306. See text accompanying note 278 supra.
307. See generally 43 C.F.R. § 4100-30 (1969) (grazing administration).
308. See generally 43 C.F.R. § 2410 (1969).
309. See text accompanying note 142 supra.
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to say that if discretion is unobjectionable when conferred by statute, it is similarly unobjectionable when found in the regulations.
The crucial difference is that the statute confers discretion upon
the Secretary, an executive official, whereas the regulations, as a
practical matter, confer that discretion upon various lesser administrators. One result of conferring broad discretion upon lesser officials is that opportunities for judicial observation and inquiry into
administrative processes are minimal. Persons having an interest in
the highly important classification decisions are placed at an additional disadvantage by the failure of the regulations to establish any
clear administrative appeal procedures by which interested persons
can effectively make known their views to executive officers of the
Department.310
b. Mandamus proceedings. The scope of review in mandamus
proceedings is much narrower than that in APA proceedings, both
as to questions of fact and to questions of law. In general, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant officer "owes a duty" to the
plaintiff, and the courts may limit themselves to compelling the performance of that duty only when "the duty in a particular situation
is so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt and equivalent to
a positive command."311 Few statutes are wholly free from doubt;
and with respect to the mandamus remedy, courts show "great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency
charged with its administration."312 Thus, even if the officer's function in question is entirely adjudicatory, as it is in determining
whether a mining claimant has complied with statutory criteria
which create a right to a patent, that officer probably cannot be compelled by mandamus to take certain action, such as to issue the
patent, because the officer may be making a statutory interpretation
as well as a factual determination. In effect, then, the officer has
discretion not only to find the facts, but also to choose the law.813
Conceivably the apparently greater deference accorded administrative interpretations when relief is sought by mandamus rather
than by other means could lead to a situation in which the statutory
interpretation that is applied in large cases in which the claimant
can meet the requirements for federal-question jurisdiction may be
a different statutory interpretation from that accorded to claimants
whose only practical access to judicial review is by mandamus. Such
a result would be anomalous, to say the least; and it is perhaps one
factor that has prompted some commentators to call for a less re310. See text accompanying note 131-35 supra.
311. Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206, 218 (1930).
312. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
313. JAFFE 183-84.
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strictive approach to mandamus relief under the Mandamus and
Venue Act. 314
Ill.

.ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. General Considerations
An examination of the administrative procedures governing the
public lands and of the administrative and judicial treatment of
disputes arising under those procedures suggests the existence of
needless complexity and of vast administrative discretion subject to
no adequate control by either the courts or the executive. It is suggested that public-lands administration, and certainly those persons
who deal with the lands agencies or who othenvise have an interest
in the management of public lands, would stand to benefit from an
expansion in the availability of judicial review.
Many of the obstacles to judicial review of administrative decisions seem to be irrational, at least in the public-lands context. One
example is the minimum amount necessary for federal-question
jurisdiction. Of questionable value in any context,315 it can in the
public-lands area serve to inflict unnecessary hardship on would-be
litigants who, if they cannot demonstrate that 10,000 dollars is in
controversy, must either structure their complaints to meet the technicalities of mandamus jurisdiction or bring their actions in the
District of Columbia-often a distant, expensive, and unfamiliar
forum. 316 What good purpose is served by that requirement is not
clear; what is clear is that the jurisdictional-amount requirement
promotes disuniformity of decision, with success often depending
upon whether a court accepts at face value a plaintiff's assertion of
jurisdiction or contrives to find jurisdiction under some other statute such as the AP A.
A related obstacle to judicial review, and one which is similarly
of questionable value, is the necessity for meeting narrow technical
requirements in order to gain mandamus jurisdiction in the federal
district courts.317 The inquiries necessitated are whether the defendant "owes a duty" to a plaintiff and whether the act sought is
"ministerial" or "discretionary." Some commentators have suggested
that this narrow construction of the requirements for mandamus is
not in harmony with a supposed intent of Congress to confer on
district courts jurisdiction for land disputes generally.318 In any
314.
315,
316.
317.
318.

See Byse &: Fiocca, supra note 214, at 331-36; Parr, supra note 278, at 20-21.
See generally Cramton 436-46.
See text accompanying notes 231-37 supra.
See text accompanying notes 240, 311 supra.
See, e.g., Parr, supra note 278, at 21.
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event, the operation of that judicial approach is rendered somewhat irrational by the fact that in many cases a plaintiff who is
denied relief in the district court because of failure to meet mandamus requirements can still obtain relief by means of a change of
forum and a change in pleading.319
Another needless obstacle to judicial review is the possibility
that relief may be denied if the case happens to be one in which it
is necessary to join as defendants both federal officers and persons
who are not federal officers. The restriction of the district court's
venue by the Mandamus and Venue Act320 to situations in which
"each" defendant is a federal official works a needless and irrational
hardship on plaintiffs who, because of that quirk in the statute, may
be obliged to sojourn in the District of Columbia if they want to
obtain judicial review. 321
Another obstacle to judicial review is sovereign immunity. That
doctrine, although arguably less irrational in purpose than the foregoing jurisdictional problems, is at least as effective in diverting
courts' attention from the merits to artificial issues; and the doctrine
is probably even less consistent in application than are the jurisdictional problems.322 It might be argued that sovereign immunity
is less objectionable when applied to public-lands controversies than
it is when applied to other areas. After all, the sale and granting of
leases and permits on the public lands is an exercise by the Government of its proprietorship. Broad discretion, it might be argued, is
peculiarly appropriate when the Government acts as proprietor dispensing gratuities; and if the Larson doctrine results in broadening
that discretion, it is not great cause for concern. That analysis, however, fails in many respects. It displays as a premise the proposition
that so long as the Government is exercising its proprietorship and
not regulating personal or property rights, the idea that administrative agencies should be subject to judicial control is somehow less
applicable. Whatever merit that proposition may have is diminished
when it is realized that as a practical matter in most public-lands
cases, it is not the "Government" acting, but a lower- or middleechelon bureaucrat. That latter observation should prompt at least
some inquiry into the process of administrative decision making in
order to help ensure a proper nexus between the administrative decision and the policy of the executive to whom the discretion has
been delegated. Hence, even when sovereign immunity concerns
only proprietary functions, that doctrine may afford too much shelter.
Moreover, sovereign immunity in public-lands cases is not limited
319.
320.
321.
322,

See text acocmpanying notes 225-28 supra.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1964). See text accompanying notes 226-28 supra.
See text accompanying notes 225-28 supra.
See text accompanying notes 193-202 supra.
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to strictly proprietary situations; it may also operate in cases involving statutory rights and privileges or even real-property rights.
In fact, it seems that the doctrine is less likely to be applied in cases
such as Udall v. Talman, 323 which involve a clear propriety function,
than it is in cases in which "proprietorship" is conspicuously absent,
such as lifalone v. Bowdoin,324 Simons v. Vinson,325 and Gardner v.
Harris. 326 Whatever virtue sovereign immunity may have with respect to proprietary actions is clearly lacking when its application
operates to permit administrative officials to accomplish by their
wrongful actions what the Government could not accomplish legally
by way of eminent domain. It is to be hoped that the near future
will see some statutory alleviation of the hardships permitted by the
doctrine as it is now applied.327
Another aspect of existing standards for judicial review which
may work a substantial hardship on a party aggrieved by an administrative decision concerns the scope of review granted. In general,
courts quite rightly review only "questions of law" and not questions of fact. So long as the fact-finding process of the administrative
agency conforms to general notions or fundamental fairness, there
is no objection to that judicial policy. But with the exception of
the few instances in which formal APA-type hearings are available,
the fact-finding practices of the lands agencies of the Department
of the Interior leave some doubt as to whether considerations of
fundamental fairness are really satisfied. When an applicant is
denied opportunity to confront, or even to hear the testimony of,
adverse witnesses; when he is given no opportunity to see the hearing examiner's proposed findings, but must on appeal shoot in the
dark at what may be important issues; and when the facts which are
relied upon for the final administrative decision and which will
comprise the factual "record" for judicial review may have been
gathered by faceless investigators during the course of an appeal,
there is at least some question concerning the fairness or accuracy of
the resulting record.328
Even the review given to administrative determinations of questions of law may be sharply limited by judicial deference to administrative decisions. 329 Substantial deference is given to secretarial
determinations of statutory authority; and in that regard, at least
323. 380 U.S. I (1965).
324. 369 U.S. 643 (1962).
325. 394 F.2d 732 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 968 (1968).
326. 391 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1968).
327. Proposals for statutory reform of the sovereign immunity doctrine have been
developed by Professors Byse and Cramton. See Byse 1525; Cramton 428.
328. See text accompanying notes 40-45, 58-65, 289-94 supra.
329. See text accompanying notes 302-14 supra.
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some deference is necessary to ensure smooth administration. But
administrative interpretations of regulations may be viewed by the
courts with excessive deference, to be upset only if no plausible
grounds for the administrative interpretation exist. The result seems
to be the encouragement of vague and confusing regulations, of
which nearly any interpretation may be deemed "plausible." Such
regulations operate to foreclose judicial review and have the effect
of shifting the element of discretion away from the executive officers, to whom it was granted by Congress, and toward the lowerlevel administrators, whose control over fact finding and record
making is likely to channel the interpretation and the result in the
final administrative-and judicial-decision in any particular case.
Moreover, the vague and obfuscatory regulations seemingly encouraged by the deferential policy tend to afford only uncertainty to
persons who will deal with the Department. One result can be
wasted effort, because the lack of specific rules and regulations may
serve to encourage persons to apply for land dispositions which they
would not have sought if they had had advance knowledge of the
Department's policy. Another apparent result of inadequate regulations is the emphasis given to individual case adjudications, in
which there may occur the announcement of policies having farreaching implications. There is at least a possibility that the decisions reached in such cases are based on rather narrow considerations
because third parties who stand to be affected by the general policy
lack notice of the pending proceedings and therefore do not have
the opportunity to participate in those proceedings; indeed, even if
there were notice, those persons are probably not permitted to intervene in such proceedings.330
There seems to be no good reason why courts should continue to
accord to administrative findings and actions under secretarial regulations so strong a presumption of validity. No real purpose is served
by that presumption; the underlying reason for it is probably the
courts' reluctance to enter confusing areas which are thought to be
better suited for the technical expertise of administrators than for
judicial inquiry. But it might be questioned whether professional
expertise is really a valid consideration in many disputes arising in
the public-lands area. Perhaps the deference is appropriate in situations such as those long-term development projects which involve
highly sophisticated questions of cost-benefit analysis; but such questions would rarely be present in homestead or grazing permit applications, and courts seem reasonably well suited to pass upon the
fairness and legality of administrative decisions in such cases. The
benefits of judicial review which would accrue in those areas could
be gained by discarding the strong presumption of validity currently
330. See text accompanying notes 112-18 supra.

May 1970]

Comments

1247

accorded to administrative findings and regulation interpretations.
Such a shift need not mean that the courts would have to become involved in the highly technical determinations in which there is good
reason for judicial deference. Courts seem generally aware of their
limitations, and it is reasonable to assume that there would be few
instances in which courts would involve themselves in technical
problems that are better left to the experts.

B. Treatment of Third-Party Interests
The public lands have national importance as well as importance for large segments of local communities in the western states.
The interests of the public generally in the uses made of the public
lands suggest the need for some public voice in determining policies
of wide-ranging importance. Moreover, the strong impact which the
management of the public lands may have on local communities
with respect to both land-use planning and economic well-being
suggests the need for some kind of institutionalized consideration of
what may loosely be termed third-party interests-that is, the interests of persons not directly concerned in any given controversy.
At present, little recognition is given to those third-party interests either in the administrative process or in the courts. In most
administrative determinations, the status accorded to third parties
is that of a "protestant." As such, one has no right to appeal, since
that privilege is limited to "aggrieved persons who are parties to the
case" and who are "adversely affected." If a third party's complaint
is related to what he apprehends as being "the public interest," it
might be expected, as a general matter, that such an interest would
be more likely to receive fair consideration if it were heard at a
level near that of the policy-making executive than it would in the
local land office. The possibility of insufficient consideration at the
local level seems particularly strong if the dispute concerns a disposition which could benefit a local economy, but which might be
objected to by third parties seeking to represent, for example, conservation interests. If indeed there is thought to be a general public
interest in such disposition, it is desirable to establish some administrative procedure whereby mere protestants might have an opportunity to be heard on other than the local level. The need to establish some procedure of this type is heightened by the fact that case
dispositions have assumed great importance on account of the absence of adequate regulations which might have been promulgated
if greater consideration were given to general public interests.
An objection to providing an expanded forum for consideration
of third-party views may be found in the statement of the regulations that decisions generally do not become effective until all appeals have been exhausted; clearly it would not be in the interests
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of efficient administration to permit a disgruntled "self-appointed
guardian of the public interest" to delay a land disposition to which
no one immediately concerned has objected. The problem that such
a delay could pose is aggravated by the fact that administrative appeal can often be an interminable process,331 despite the Department's strict enforcement of filing deadlines.
This objection could be alleviated, however, and side benefits
realized, if the processing of appeals could be expedited. The stock
answer to the problem of administrative delay is to call for an
increased staff. but that approach seems unlikely at a time of purported government austerity. Moreover, an increased staff might not
provide a satisfactory solution, particularly if bureaucracy really
does possess an ability for an infinite expansion of work. A better
approach, then, would be to reduce the volume of appeals, and it
seems that a significant step could be taken in that direction if there
were better departmental dissemination of public information. If
better regulatory material were made available-a result that could
be encouraged by the courts through a reduced deference to departmental interpretations of vague regulations-presumably fewer futile appeals would be attempted.
Another manner in which objections to permitting third-party
appeals might be met is through the Secretary's exercise of his currently available discretionary power to permit initial decisions or
portions of them to become immediately effective.332 One difficulty
with that approach, however, is that applicants would still be reluctant to commence operations in reliance upon an initial decision
if that decision were subject to appellate alteration. Moreover, third
parties might object that the feared harm to the land might be an
accomplished fact by the time their appeal could receive appellate
consideration. But both difficulties could be minimized if there were
provision for according priority treatment to administrative appeals
in cases in which the initial decision has been made immediately
effective. Coupled with the reduced appellate workload which could
result from making better regulatory material available in order to
permit parties to gauge more accurately the probable outcome on
appeal, a provision for priority appeal could adequately satisfy the
objections to permitting third-party appeals.
An area in which there is a severe need for better attention to
third-party interests is that of classification. At the present time,
classification does not ensure the consideration of, or even notice to,
third parties; and the segregation provisions render administrative
331. In some instances administrative proceedings may take up to five years. See
Carver, The Federal Proprietary Function-A Neglected Aspect of Federal Administrative Law, 19 ABA AD. L. REv. 107, 113 (1966).
332. See text accompanying note 268 supra.
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appeal nearly meaningless for everyone concerned.333 It is at the
classification stage that policy determinations affecting broad areas
are made, and it is at that stage that consideration of the claims of
third parties representing the "public interest" would most appropriately take place. Yet "public hearings" are required only for very
large classifications; and the efficacy of such hearings is uncertain,
since the regulations provide only that the "authorized officer" consider the issues raised. There is no provision for compiling from
those hearings a factual record for review; indeed, it appears that
standard administrative review is not permitted and that the only
further review allowed is that of "petitioning" the Secretary by some
unstated method. 334 It is not clear who may petition; but it is clear
that no review at all is possible until the initial classification decision is published, and that such publication may occur as much as
four years after segregation and uses consistent with the proposed
classification have begun. At the very least, then, there should be
explicit provision for administrative review of proposed classifications as well as of the more final "initial classifications." Whatever
harm there would be in permitting review of proposed classifications
seems minimal in comparison to the present situation in which the
"authorized officer" who proposes the classification is able to exercise nearly all the broad discretion which was granted to the Secretary under the 1964 statute.335
The same considerations which support increased administrative
review of third-party interests also lend support to arguments for
judicial review of such interests. If there is a need for greater consideration of the interests of the "public" when decisions having a
broad policy impact are made, and if therefore there is a need for
administrative review of such decisions, then it seems appropriate to
promote fairness and consistency of decision by having judicial review available as well. But judicial review of a proposed classification, for example, might entail a departure from many traditional
standards for judicial review. Technically, the proposed classification is not a final decision, and it may not become so until the
period for petitioning the Secretary has expired.336 But since there
is no provision preventing an initial classification from being operational before appeal, it could reasonably be argued that the
decision is final when the initial classification is published. In addition, it might be argued that in some cases, the decision is final as a
practical matter as soon as it is proposed by the authorized officer,
for that proposal commences the segregation thereby opening the
333.
334.
335.
336.

See text accompanying notes 137-42 supra.
See text accompanying note 133 supra.
43 U.S.C. § 1411 (1964). See also text accompanying notes 140-42 supra.
See text accompanying notes 252-63 supra.
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land for consistent uses. If the harm alleged is that the uses permitted by the proposed classification will make the land unsuitable for
the purpose for which it is argued that the land ought to be classified, then it might be possible to fit that argument within the traditional standards for irreparable harm.337
An additional barrier to judicial review of a proposed classification is the problem of standing.338 If the person seeking review of
the decision is the petitioner whose application initially triggered
the classification process, the standing problem is solved relatively
easily. But if the party seeking review is, for instance, a conservation
group, that requirement is not so easily satisfied. In recent years,
however, there has been a substantial relaxation in standing requirements, particularly for public-interest groups and conservation
groups. Of particular interest in the latter regard are Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference v. FPC,339 and Citizens Committee for the
Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 340 both of which permitted standing for
conservation groups. But those cases were decided by reference to
particular statutes which directed the agencies to give consideration
to scenic and conservation interests,341 whereas in disputes concerning public lands administered by the Department of the Interior,
such specific statutes are seldom available. That distinction may
have been rendered less important, however, by a recent Supreme
Court decision in which Scenic Hudson and United Church of
Christ v. FCC 342 were cited for the proposition that the interest
which produced standing may sometimes "reflect 'aesthetic, conservational, and recreational' as well as economic values." 343 Moreover,
general statutes dealing with public lands contain references to
337. An important element in determining whether administrative remedies have
been exhausted is whether an adequate administrative remedy is available. JAFF!426-32. Traditionally, an administrative remedy is inadequate if it does not insure
against "irreparable injury" to the aggrieved party. Id. 428-30. See also Isbrandtsen
v. United States, 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
338. See notes 156-74 supra and accompanying text.
339. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965). For further discussion of this case, see Sive,

Securing, Examining, and Cross-Examining Expert Witnesses in Environmental Cases,
68 MICH. L. REv. 1175 (1970).
340. 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). For further discussion of this case, see Sive,
supra note 339, at 1182-85.
341. Cf. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 38 U.S.L.W,
4193 (U.S. March 3, 1970) (data processing companies have standing to challenge
legality of bank's entry into data processing business); Office of Communication of the
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (standing for citizen's
group to challenge FCC license reviewed); Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp.
650, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (standing for citizen's group to sue based on language in
statute directing concern for local needs).
342. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
343. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 38 U.S.L.W,
4193 (U.S. March 3, 1970).

May 1970]

Comments

1251

wilderness or conservation considerations,344 and perhaps it would
not entail too great a logical jump to go from standing under the
Transportation Act3 45 or the Federal Power Commission statute346
to an inference of standing from such statutes as the Multiple Use
and Sustained Yield Act347 under which classification takes place.
Thus, the traditional barriers to review at the classification stage
do not appear insuperable for a sympathetic court. The truly difficult issues with respect to judicial review for conservationists or
others challenging proposed lands classifications concern the question of administrative discretion and the proper relationship of the
judiciary to matters relating to administrative discretion. Few
imaginable functions of the Department of the Interior are more
policy-related or involve more discretion than does classification.
The fundamental question, then, is whether it is proper for courts
to become involved at all in matters so inherently discretionary. Indeed, there may be some very serious doubts that it would be wise
to characterize as questions of law such delicate decisions as the
balancing of the interests of conservationists against the interests of
the public and the nation in the development of resources and in
the supply of low-cost building materials and fuels. The nation's
needs and policies in this area are volatile, and reduction of those
issues to questions of law might result in stifling the flexibility necessary to meet national needs. Such decisions, it may reasonably be
argued, should be left to political determination.
Yet one may question whether these decisions are really made
by political determination in the sense desired. Indeed, in view of
the fact that low-level administrators apparently have broad discretion for classification-due in part perhaps to the lack of adequate secretarial regulations-one might question how responsive
classification proposals are to political direction except in the very
broadest sense. First, it is uncertain how far down into the bureaucratic complex the political pressures can extend effectively. The
frequent allusions to the control of the executive by the bureaucracy
suggest that effective political control may be an illusory goal. Second, even if political pressures are felt by the administrators who
collectively wield the power of bureaucracy, it is doubtful that those
344. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 14ll(a) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968); cf. 16 U.S.C. § 460(l) (1964).
345. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 134 (1964); 23 U.S.C. § 138 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). Road
Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
346. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 803 (1964); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v.
FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
347. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1411-18 (1964). Conservation interests which arguably are recognized in that Act are found in the criteria for classification, which include, but are
not limited to, fish and wildlife development and utilization, outdoor recreation,
wilderness preservation, and ecology.
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pressures will be of the sort envisaged by proponents of political
control. That doubt is based not on any devil theory of corrupt
politics, but simply on the likelihood that, as a practical matter,
whatever pressures are felt by low-level administrators in a geographically decentralized administrative structure are likely to be
parochial in nature and hence not responsive to political guidance
from the executive policy makers, except perhaps in those very large
cases which assume the proportions of a national scandal.
In this connection, limited judicial activity could promote an
appropriate balance. By exerting pressure on administrative agencies to reach their decisions in an open manner and to afford a voice
to the interested public, the courts could encourage a more responsive administration and at the same time could avoid excessive judicial interference in questions of discretionary policy. That pressure
could be brought through judicial emphasis not on the substantive
policy issues involved, but rather on the procedures by which decisions are made.
The device available for such an approach is that of remand, and
indeed there is a significant degree of precedent for that approach.
Many state courts have extensively utilized the device of remand to
enforce upon administrators of the public resources what has been
termed the public-trust doctrine. 348 In fact, state courts have applied
that doctrine even to legislatures as a positive limitation on the
powers of those bodies.349 Federal courts have not so applied the
doctrine as a check on the Congress, and probably neither can nor
should go that far. But federal courts have increasingly used the
remand device to express dissatisfaction with certain administrative
procedures and to prod agencies into greater consideration of a
broad range of interests, including conservational interests, in making administrative decisions. In Udall v. FPC,350 for example, a decision of the Federal Power Commission was remanded for further
consideration on the ground that the Commission had not exercised
the "informed judgment" required by a relevant statute. Similarly,
remand was utilized in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v.
FPC351 and Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe. 352
348. See, e.g., Muench v. Public Serv. Commn., 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, aff'd
on rehearing, 261 Wis. 515c, 55 N.W.2d 40 (1952); Texas East Transmission Corp. v.
Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 48 N.J. 261, 225 A.2d 130 (1966). See generally Sax, The
Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68
MICH. L. R.Ev. 471, 491-556 (1970).
349. See, e.g., Gould v. Greylock Reservation Commn., 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d
114 (1966); Muench v. Public Serv. Commn., 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, afjd. on
rehearing, 261 Wis. 515c, 55 N.W.2d 40 (1952).
350. 387 U.S. 428 (1967).
351. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
352. 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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Admittedly, these cases involved special circumstances and statutes
and are hence distinguishable from situations relating to the activities of the Department of the Interior. But even with respect to
review of the decisions of the Department of the Interior, remand
as a gesture of judicial dissatisfaction is not unknown, even when
the power exercised by the Secretary is entirely discretionary.353
IV.

CONCLUSION

In the next few years, controversies over the public lands are
likely to reverse their long-term declining trend and to increase in
attention and importance. If nothing else, the current political popularity of environmental issues seems to ensure that increased attention will be given to the uses made of the federal public lands.
Moreover, the report and recommendations of the Public Land Law
Review Commission, due June 30, 1970, is certain to spark new debate concerning uses and dispositions of the public lands.354 Indeed,
many of the current laws and practices, such as those relating to
classification, are nominally temporary pending the recommendations of the Commission.355 Nevertheless, current practices remain
important, for decisions made now will have long-range effects, and
current practice seems likely to continue at least until Congress acts
on the Commission's recommendations.
Current practices could benefit greatly from reform. The practice of lands administration seems to be one of paternalism and
broad discretion throughout the administrative structure, with inadequate procedures and public information for persons dealing
with the public-lands agencies. Departmental appeals procedures
are frequently inadequate, and the availability of judicial review
of wrongful or arbitrary action is hampered by numerous artificial
barriers which serve little or no rational purpose. As a result, there
is a substantial need for increased judicial and legislative attention
to the practices of the lands agencies, in order to encourage better
rule-making and adjudicatory procedures and in order to ensure
that when the Department exercises its discretionary authority over
the public lands, it gives adequate consideration to the various public interests at stake.
353. See, e.g., Tagula v. Gorsuch, 411 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1969); Pressentin v. Seaton,
284 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Secretary directed to consider appeal of mining claimant
whose filing had been rejected as untimely). See also Denison v. Udall, 248 F. Supp. 942
(D. Ariz. 1965) (court reversed Secretary's denial of application for mining patent and
remanded for further proceeding); accord, Richardson v. Udall, 253 F. Supp. 72 (D.
Idaho 1966) (homestead application).
354. The legislation of 1964 created the Public Land Law Review Commission, 43
U.S.C. §§ 1391-400 (1964), the purpose of which is to make a systematic study of longterm needs concerning the public lands and then to report to Congress with recommendations for future use and disposition of the public lands.
355. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1411 (1964) (introductory clause).

